More pessimism than greediness: a characterization of monotone risk aversion in the rank-dependent expected utility model

Summary. This paper studies monotone risk aversion, the aversion to monotone, mean-preserving increase in risk (Quiggin [21]), in the Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) model. This model replaces expected utility by another functional, characterized by two functions, a utility function u in conjunction with a probability-perception function f. Monotone mean-preserving increases in risk are closely related to the notion of comparative dispersion introduced by Bickel and Lehmann [3,4] in Non-parametric Statistics. We present a characterization of the pairs (u,f) of monotone risk averse decision makers, based on an index of greediness G _u of the utility function u and an index of pessimism P _f of the probability perception function f: the decision maker is monotone risk averse if and only if . The index of greediness (non-concavity) of u is the supremum of taken over . The index of pessimism of f is the infimum of taken over 0 < v < 1. Thus, , with G _u = 1 iff u is concave. If then , i.e., f is majorized by the identity function. Since P _f = 1 for Expected Utility maximizers, forces u to be concave in this case; thus, the characterization of risk aversion as is a direct generalization from EU to RDEU. A novel element is that concavity of u is not necessary. In fact, u must be concave only if P _f = 1.Received: 10 April 2001, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D81. Correspondence to: Michéle CohenAlain Chateauneuf, Michéle Cohen, Isaac Meilijson: We are most grateful to Mark Machina, Peter Wakker and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions and comments.     

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at -majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a -majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that -majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D52, D71, G39. Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés.     

Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

External cooperation and entrepreneurial orientation in industrial clusters

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between external cooperation and entrepreneurial orientation (EO). This relationship is explored in cluster environment, wherein entrepreneurial organizations compete and cooperate simultaneously to pursue opportunities. The following hypothesis is tested: External cooperation is positively correlated with entrepreneurial orientation. The hypothesis is tested with a correlation analysis on a sample of 77 small-sized enterprises operating in the Malopolska region in Poland, wherein several clusters are active. Additionally, the regression analysis is conducted to examine the associations between inter-organizational cooperation and EO dimensions. The findings confirm that external cooperation is positively correlated with EO. This observation is confronted with a pro-competitive approach that is a constitutional element of the entrepreneurship concept. Moreover, the findings show that the correlation between external cooperation and a firm’s performance is stronger than between some other EO dimensions and performance. Additionally, the findings show the important role of relationships between organizations and their clients. In the paper, several remarks for development of the theory are discussed, including the need for incorporating inter-organizational cooperation into a set of entrepreneurial traits and reflecting it in entrepreneurial orientation scales. The findings confirm the importance of that direction of theory development that focuses on inter-organizational collaboration in the context of entrepreneurship.     

Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

Prescribed conditional interaction structure models with application to the analysis of mobility tables

The present paper considers some new models for the analysis of multidimensional contigency tables. Although the theoretical background used here appeared already in Haberman (1974), prescribed conditional interaction (PCIN) models were introduced by Rudas (1987) and their mathematical properties were worked out by Leimer and Rudas (1988). These models are defined by prescribing the values of certain conditional interactions in the contingency table. Conditional interaction is defined here as the logarithm of an appropriately defined conditional odds ratio. This conditional odds ratio is a conditional version of a generalization of the well known odds ratio of a 2×2 table and that of the three factor interaction term of a 2×2×2 table and applies to any number of dimensions and any number of categories of the variables. The well known log-linear (LL) models are special PCIN models. Estimated frequencies under PCIN models and tests of fit can be computed using existing statistical software (e.g. BMDP). The paper describes the class of PCIN models and compares it to the class of association models of Goodman (1981). As LL models are widely used in the analysis of social mobility tables, application of more general PCIN models is illustrated.     

The Geopolitics of Protected Areas

ABSTRACT

The conservation enterprise is embedded in ideas of the environment through which it promotes a vision of the world and the relations between the non-human and human. The papers in this forum analyse conservation from various vantage points to draw the links between geopolitics and conservation. The authors use three themes to demonstrate these links. The first theme draws on the concept of environmentality to show the mobilization of ecological rationalities and power towards the creation of protected areas. The second pays attention to networks formed across the distance, and how they influence the location and governance of protected areas. The third focuses on the strategies the conservation lobby uses to align local identities with global conservation ideals and goals. Collectively, these themes highlight features of conservation geopolitics.     

Geometrical Interpretation of the Mean and the Constant in a Box-Jenkins Time Series Model

Certain manuals and computer programs mistakenly identify the mean with the constant in Box-Jenkins time series models. In this paper, it will be shown that (a) the mean and the constant have different values in autoregressive models, and (b) they have an algebraic and graphical relationship.     

Aggregation of Directional Distance Functions and Industrial Efficiency

Three main objectives are pursued in this paper. First, we intend to analyze the aggregation problem of directional distance functions from a constructive viewpoint. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the structural properties of the production technology and of the nature of groups of firms. Indeed, exact additive aggregation holds for a linear technology and for a direction solely defined in the output space. Second, since these conditions are somewhat restrictive, we are interested in providing a measure for the aggregation bias through the relationship between industrial and structural technical efficiency. Finally, we show that this aggregation bias is a lower bound for industrial allocative efficiency.