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921.
This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute
performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total
payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated
tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all
tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there
are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability
of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than
the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament
(incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective
mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2 相似文献
922.
This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects
is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state
at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information.
This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the
interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions.
Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program
provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research
Program. 相似文献
923.
We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The
model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test
the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice.
Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by
asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot
games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims
than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.
相似文献
924.
Joëlle Noailly Cees A. Withagen Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,36(1):113-141
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types
of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource.
Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined
by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the
highest average payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be
the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies
coexist. We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system
favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.
相似文献
925.
Is there a case for preferential treatment of the exposed sector in an economy when compliance to an aggregate emissions constraint induced by an international environmental agreement is mandatory? This question is being debated in many countries in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. We address the issue in a general equilibrium framework and theoretically cover several market structures, including perfect competition, the large country case and oligopoly. We identify the conditions under which preferential treatment of the exposed sector is not warranted from the point of view of maximizing social welfare. In addition, we demonstrate that in the case of oligopoly, instituting a more stringent environmental policy on the exposed sector might be profit-enhancing for this sector. This finding lends theoretical support to a specific interpretation of the Porter hypothesis. 相似文献
926.
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can
be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule
yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between
the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths
and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business,
Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard
McLean and Jeroen Swinkels. 相似文献
927.
Alexandre M. Baptista 《Economic Theory》2007,31(2):205-212
In a seminal paper, Ross (Q J Econ 90:75–89, 1976) shows that if security markets are resolving, then there exist (non-redundant)
options that generate complete security markets. Complementing his work, Aliprantis and Tourky (2002) show that if security
markets are strongly resolving and the number of primitive securities is less than half the number of states, then every option is non-redundant. Our paper extends Aliprantis and Tourky’s result to the case when
their condition on the number of primitive securities is not imposed. Specifically, we show that if there exists no binary
payoff vector in the asset span, then for each portfolio there exists a set of exercise prices of full measure such that any
option on the portfolio with an exercise price in this set is non-redundant. Since the condition that there exists no binary
payoff vector in the asset span holds generically, redundant options are thus rare.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Research support from the School of Business at The George
Washington University is gratefully acknowledged 相似文献
928.
It has been argued that “paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems.” This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology. 相似文献
929.
We report on an experiment conducted to evaluate the effects of varying the way in which market information is presented to
participants in laboratory Cournot duopolies. We find that the most standard variations, which are the use of a profit table
or a profit calculator, yield indistinguishable performance. However, the addition of a best-response option to the profit
calculator tends to increase aggregate output to the Cournot level and decrease the incidence of tacit collusion. 相似文献
930.
Gabriel Y. Weintraub C. Lanier Benkard Benjamin Van Roy 《Journal of Economic Theory》2011,146(5):1965-1994
This paper explores the connection between three important threads of economic research offering different approaches to studying the dynamics of an industry with heterogeneous firms. Finite models of the form pioneered by Ericson and Pakes (1995) capture the dynamics of a finite number of heterogeneous firms as they compete in an industry, and are typically analyzed using the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). Infinite models of the form pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992), on the other hand, consider an infinite number of infinitesimal firms, and are typically analyzed using the concept of stationary equilibrium (SE). A third approach uses oblivious equilibrium (OE), which maintains the simplifying benefits of an infinite model but within the more realistic setting of a finite model. The paper relates these three approaches. The main result of the paper provides conditions under which SE of infinite models approximate MPE of finite models arbitrarily well in asymptotically large markets. Our conditions require that the distribution of firm states in SE obeys a certain “light-tail” condition. In a second set of results, we show that the set of OE of a finite model approaches the set of SE of the infinite model in large markets under a similar light-tail condition. 相似文献