Tolerance of Cheating: An Analysis Across Countries

Cheating is a serious problem in many countries. The cheater gets higher marks than deserved, thus reducing the efficiency of a country's educational system. In this study, the authors did not ask if and how often the student had cheated, but rather what the student's opinion was about a cheating situation. They investigated whether attitudes differ among students in Russia, the Netherlands, Israel, and the United States and conclude that attitudes toward cheating differ considerably between these countries. They offer various explanations of this phenomenon. In addition, they find that the student's attitude toward cheating depends on the student's educational level (high school, undergraduate, postgraduate). Finally, they show that the data from the sample can be aggregated in a natural and elegant way, and they suggest a tolerance-of-cheating index for each country.     

Investment opportunities and bankruptcy prediction

A firm's mix of growth options and assets in place is an important determinant of its optimal default strategy. Our simple model shows that shareholders of a firm with valuable investment opportunities would be able/willing to wait longer before defaulting on their contractual debt obligations than shareholders of an otherwise identical firm without such opportunities. More importantly, we show empirically using a dataset of recent corporate bankruptcies that measures of investment opportunities are significantly related to the likelihood of bankruptcy. Augmenting existing bankruptcy prediction models by these measures improves their out-of-sample forecasting ability.     

Distress Anomaly and Shareholder Risk: International Evidence

Financially distressed stocks in the United States earn puzzlingly low returns giving rise to the distress risk anomaly. We provide evidence that the anomaly exists in developed countries, but not in emerging ones. Using cross‐country analyses, we explore several potential drivers of returns to distressed stocks. The distress anomaly is stronger in countries with stronger takeover legislation, lower barriers to arbitrage, and higher information transparency. In contrast, shareholder bargaining power and expected stock return skewness in a country do not affect the anomaly. These findings suggest that various aspects of shareholders’ risk play an important role in shaping distressed stocks returns.     

The inefficiency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. When considering improvements in the borrower's creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages, we show that refinancing penalties can be welfare improving and that they can be particularly beneficial to riskier borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates, reduced defaults, and increased availability of credit. Thus, a high concentration of prepayment penalties among the riskiest borrowers can be an outcome of efficient equilibrium in a mortgage market. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the key predictions of our model.     

A Counterintuitive Argument for Résumé Embellishment

Applied ethicists say little about résumé embellishment. Presumably, this is so because résumé embellishment seems obviously wrong; an instance of ordinary lying, familiar moral prohibitions against which cover the case completely. Analysis of résumé embellishment merely as ordinary lying overlooks its collective action aspects. Taking account of those aspects and their implications, I argue on consequentialist grounds that, given some plausible background conditions, a limited form of résumé embellishment is morally permissible (and perhaps required). This outcome is a particular instantiation of a more general principle about how one ought to act when participating in a morally valuable co-ordinative practice. I conclude by identifying implications for how employers ought to use résumés in hiring decisions.     

Individual political contributions and firm performance

We present evidence that individuals make political contributions strategically by targeting politicians with power to affect their economic well-being. Individuals in Congressional districts with greater industry clustering choose to support politicians with jurisdiction over the industry. Importantly, individual political contributions are associated with improvements in operating performance of firms in industry clusters. The relation between contributions and firm performance is strongest for poorly performing firms, firms closer to financial distress, and for contributions in close elections. The results imply that individual political contributions are valuable to firms, especially during bad economic times.