INDUSTRY PROSPECTS AND ACQUIRER RETURNS IN DIVERSIFYING TAKEOVERS

We use a sample of 816 diversifying takeovers from 1978 to 2003 to examine whether takeover announcements release negative information about the future prospects of the acquirer's main industry. We find that rivals that are most similar to the acquirer (homogeneous rivals) experience significant negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around takeover announcements. Takeovers that result in negative wealth effects to acquirers are associated with negative abnormal revisions in analysts' forecasts of homogeneous rivals' earnings per share. We also find a decline in the posttakeover operating performance of rival firms. The decline is especially pronounced for homogeneous rivals and for takeovers with negative wealth effects to acquirers. Our findings imply that CAR-based estimates of acquirer wealth gains from takeovers that do not account for industrywide information releases are significantly biased downward.     

Where the Water is Free but the Buckets are Empty: Demand Analysis of Drinking Water in Rural India

This paper examines how a policy of providing free domestic water can be unsustainable. Using a conditional logit model, this research looks at the demand side and identifies the determinants of choice. Under assumptions normally associated with developing societies, the model shows that the people's perception of benefits of safe water is significant, household variables like female literacy are important variables determining the choice of safe water and the capability to pay and willingness to pay already exists. The governments in poor countries need to have a fresh look at their policy relating to rural water supply.     

CAUSALITY TESTS OF SHORT SALES ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE

Published statistics on short sales of stock are used by investors as a technical indicator of market timing. Research on this topic is mixed. Findings in this article rely on causality tests that use white noise residuals generated from time-series analysis of short sales. Results indicate that specialists' short sales lead short sales of other investors, but these other investors are unable to take advantage of the information because a time lag exists in the published data.     

The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios

We study the determinants and effects of the relative compensation of top executives and lower-level employees. First, we show that CEO–employee pay ratios depend on the balance of power between the CEO (relative to the board) and ordinary employees (relative to management). Second, our results suggest that employees do not perceive higher pay ratios as an inequitable outcome to be redressed via costly behaviors that lower productivity. We do not find a negative relation between relative pay and employee productivity, either in our full sample or in subsamples where employees are well-informed about executive pay and are protected against career retributions. Rather, we find that productivity increases with relative pay when the firm has fewer employees who are well-informed, and when promotion decisions are predominantly merit-based. We also find that firm value and operating performance both increase with relative pay. We conclude that ordinary employees appear to perceive an opportunity in higher pay ratios but the extent to which such perception incentivizes them depends on the likelihood of success in a series of sequential promotion tournaments.     

(Noisy) communication

Communication is central to many settings in marketing and economics. A focal attribute of communication is miscommunication. We model this key characteristic as a noise in the messages communicated, so that the sender of a message is uncertain about its perception by the receiver, and then identify the strategic consequences of miscommunication. We study a model where competing senders (of different types) can invest in improving the precision of the informative but noisy message they send to a receiver, and find that there exists a separating equilibrium where senders’ types are completely revealed. Thus, although communication is noisy it delivers perfect results in equilibrium. This result stems from the fact that a sender’s willingness to invest in improving the precision of their messages can itself serve as a signal. Interestingly, the content of the messages is ignored by the receiver in such a signaling equilibrium, but plays a central role by shaping her beliefs off the equilibrium path (and thus, enables separation between the types). This result also illustrates the uniqueness of the signaling model presented here. Unlike other signaling models, the suggested model does not require that the costs and benefits of the senders will be correlated with their types to achieve separation. The model’s results have implications for various marketing communication tools such as advertising and sales forces.

Analysis of Uncertainty as Opposed to Risk: An Experimental Approach

The paper illustrates the scope for enhancing the conceptual apparatus used by agricultural economists to analyse decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Selected empirical results from experiments on student subjects from three universities are reported. Three issues are considered. First, the reasons for choice and the understanding of a choice problem are examined. Second, attitudes towards different levels of uncertainty are measured. Third, the possibility that apparently non-normative psychological factors influence choice is explored. The paper serves to illustrate and support a number of methodological points. The major points are that a risk-uncertainty distinction is useful (contrary to the aging conventional wisdom of economic theory), that laboratory experiments can potentially provide data of use to agricultural economists, and that predictive models of choice under uncertainty may be more accurate if they take account of psychological variables which influence the decision-making processes of human subjects.     

Share Repurchase Offers and Liquidity: An Examination of Temporary and Permanent Effects

Open-market repurchase programs do not allow for precise estimates of share buy-back intensity to measure liquidity effects. To circumvent the uncertainty surrounding the quantity and timing of shares truly acquired in repurchase programs and to measure their long-term impact, we examine Dutch auctions and fixed-price tender offers. We investigate both the temporary and permanent liquidity effects of share repurchase programs and find that the improvement in liquidity is transitory and limited to the tender period when the firm's offer to repurchase shares is outstanding. Improvements in liquidity over longer intervals appear to be the result of an overall price improvement and a reduction in volatility rather than the result of structural change in market dynamics.     

CHANGES IN TRADING ACTIVITY FOLLOWING STOCK SPLITS AND THEIR EFFECT ON VOLATILITY AND THE ADVERSE-INFORMATION COMPONENT OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD

We examine changes in trading activity around stock splits and their effect on volatility and the adverse-information component of the bid-ask spread. Even after controlling for microstructure biases, we find a significant increase in volatility after the split. Changes in total volatility and in its permanent component are positively related to changes in the number of trades. This suggests that both informed and noise traders contribute to changes in trading activity. Further, while the adverse-information component of the spread increases unconditionally after the split, the change is negatively related to the change in trading activity. The results suggest that a crucial determinant of liquidity changes after a stock split is the success of the split in attracting new trades in the security.     

So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships

While many empirical studies document borrower benefits of lending relationships, less is known about lender benefits. A relationship lender's informational advantage over a non-relationship lender may generate a higher probability of selling information-sensitive products to its borrowers. Our results show that the probability of a relationship lender providing a future loan is 42%, while for a non-relationship lender, this probability is 3%. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers with greater information asymmetries are significantly likely to obtain future loans from their relationship lenders. Relationship lenders are likely to be chosen to provide debt/equity underwriting services, but this effect is economically small.