Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India

The East India Company's conquest of India was facilitated by the behavior of its Indian rivals who not only did not ally against it, but often supported it militarily. Historians have typically attributed this to myopia, the failure to understand the long-term threat represented by the Company. We examine the negotiations leading up to a key conflict, the Third Mysore War, and find that the Company's allies were not myopic. The British parliament had, in 1784, passed Pitt's India Act, which limited the scope for unprovoked military aggression by the Company in India. This had changed the behavior of the Company, making its promises more credible. This enhanced credibility made it possible for the Company to secure as allies Indian regimes that were acting strategically in their self-interest. This is a new explanation for an old puzzle.     

Advertising,the matchmaker

We empirically study the informational role of advertising in matching consumers with products when consumers are uncertain about both observable and unobserved program attributes. Our focus is on the network television industry, in which the products are television shows. We estimate a model that allows us to distinguish between the direct effect of advertising on utility and its effect through the information set. A notable behavioral implication is that exposure to informational advertising can decrease the consumer’s tendency to purchase the promoted product. The structural estimates imply that an exposure to a single advertisement decreases the consumer’s probability of not choosing her best alternative by approximately 10%. Our results are relevant for industries characterized by product proliferation and horizontal differentiation.     

Promotion Incentives and Corporate Performance: Is There a Bright Side to “Overpaying” the CEO?

Earlier studies have shown that stronger equity-based incentives for CEOs are generally associated with better corporate performance and higher values. In this article, the authors report the findings of their recent study of the effects of promotion-based "tournament" incentives for non-CEO executives (or "VPs") on corporate performance for a large sample of companies during the 12-year period from 1993-2004.
The study's main finding is that such tournament incentives, as measured by the pay differential between the CEO and VPs, were associated with better corporate operating performance and higher corporate stock returns. Moreover, tournament incentives, as one would expect, appeared to be more effective when CEOs were nearing retirement—but less effective when the firm had a new CEO (and even weaker when the new CEO was an outsider).     

Re-visiting collaborative behavior in supply networks – structural embeddedness and the influence of contextual changes and sanctions

This study considers decision making beyond a dyadic buyer-supplier context to the network context. Decisions made by firms are shaped by behavioral norms within the supply network as perceived by the decision makers. Firms can perceive themselves to be part of a collaborative regime or one in which the potential for non-cooperation is high. Further, the ability to put sanctions on non-cooperating firms could shape the overall behavioral patterns in the network. To gain further insights into these aspects and their interactive effects on firm behavior, our study investigates decision-making in supply network by means of behavioral experiments. By organizing practicing managers in a supply network, the study investigates the role of structural embeddedness, incentive structure, and sanctioning mechanisms on the level of collaboration. The results of this study confirm that while sanctions are detrimental for collaborative behavior in a supply network, they play an important role when the underlying norms of governance of such a network are perturbed. The results show that structural embeddedness provides a context that aids adaptive collaborative behavior by firms that are part of the supply network. Once the incentive structure is altered such that there is a higher payoff from defection, the adaptive collaborative behavior is replaced by a behavior in which firms try to maximize their returns and forego collaborative decision-making behavior.     

Cleaning house: Stock reassignments on the NYSE

A frequently occurring, yet unexplored, phenomenon of the New York Stock Exchange specialist system is that of reassignments of stocks by specialist firms on the floor of the Exchange. These events change the portfolios at the individual specialist level by reassigning one or more stocks from one individual specialist portfolio to another. We find that reassigned stocks have unusually wide spreads before reassignments and experience a decline in spreads to levels comparable to matched stocks after the reassignment. This improvement in liquidity is associated with a reduced cost of capital for the reassigned firms. We find that portfolio size, and industry and size concentration of the individual specialist portfolios are associated with the decision of specialist firms to reassign stocks.     

An approach to prioritize customer-based,cost-effective service enhancements

Service firms routinely enhance their offerings to satisfy and retain current customers and to attract new customers. We show theoretically that service improvements can be prioritized by simultaneously taking into account the likely incremental revenue (through increased customer value) and the incremental cost of making the improvement. The customer values obtained from a sample of respondents, and cost estimates obtained from managers of the service providing organization are combined to prioritize improvements using a ‘bang for the buck’ (i.e. value/cost) rule. Such a prioritization would be helpful to come up with a ‘short list’ of service improvements. The items on the short list can be evaluated in detail for their ‘Return on Quality’. The approach for prioritization is illustrated in the context of improving passenger train service between a pair of cities in India. An adaptive self-explicated approach is used for obtaining customer values and cost estimates. The customer values so elicited display substantial cross-validity.     

BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACQUISITIONS,STOCKHOLDER RETURNS,AND REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY

This paper examines the returns accruing to the bank holding company (BHC) stockholders when an acquisition is initiated by the BHC. There is a significant, positive abnormal return to these shareholders when the acquisition is announced. The magnitude of this return does not depend on the relative size of the acquired firm. Further, the regulatory environment for these BHC acquisitions introduces uncertainty about the eventual outcome of the review process. Upon approval from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the BHC stockholders earn an additional, significantly positive abnormal return.     

At the bottom of a global commodity chain––how different really are hourly wage rates and piece rates?

Employers have a number of different ways in which they can pay their employees. Discussions of the forms of wage payment were once very fashionable and they still remain important in terms of practice, but in theoretical terms, they have disappeared from the radar and been less central to recent analysis of work. On the surface, without any theoretical analysis and primarily empirical evidence, it appears that there is a major difference between ‘time wage’ rate and ‘piece wage’ rate. This article via Marxist theoretical analysis and primarily empirical evidence from Australian, New Zealand, Chinese and Fiji garment firms argued that there is a high level of similarity between time rate and piece rate. The empirical research findings of the Fiji garment industry shows that a time rate is not really much different from a piece rate, and in fact, a time rate is a disguised form of piece rate because workers are required to meet their targets per hour via very close monitoring of output and performance. The article further argued that there exist greater work intensification and exploitation via strict management control systems such as close supervision and punitive factory rules. The article also highlighted some of the limitations of existing social science theories because they can not account for what is going on garment firms in Fiji (especially Chinese firms). The article argues that we must either expand the earlier social science theories or move beyond and developed new theories to fully capture the new emerging trends of contemporary capitalist global production system.