Redesigning the human resources function at Lafarge

This article describes the detailed process of redesigning and implementing the human resources (HR) function at Lafarge. The article argues that a well‐articulated and integrated approach of (1) recruitment, selection, and induction, (2) retraining and redeployment, (3) a performance appraisal system, (4) a compensation and reward mechanism, and (5) rightsizing and (6) integration is required to be aligned with the overall business strategy of the organization. It also reinforces that the foundation of a value‐added HR function is a business strategy that relies on people as a source of competitive advantage. Key challenges for Lafarge in the future include (1) maintaining the change momentum, (2) fast and effective integration of acquired companies and transfer of “best practices,” and (3) attracting and retaining a diverse workforce through their internationalization program. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Managing diversity through human resource management: an international perspective and conceptual framework

This paper critically reviews the literature on managing diversity through human resource management (HRM). We discuss the major issues and objectives of managing diversity and examine the state of human resource diversity management practices in organizations. Our review shows that inequality and discrimination still widely exist and HRM has focused mainly on compliance with equal employment opportunity (EEO) and affirmative action (AA) legislation. Less attention has been paid to valuing, developing and making use of diversity. Our review reveals limited literature examining how diversity is managed in organizations through effective human resource management. We develop a framework that presents strategies for HR diversity management at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. Our review also discusses the implications for practice and further research.     

Borrower runs

Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default.     

Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies

Many believe that a key innovation by the Grameen Bank is to encourage borrowers to help each other in hard times. To analyse this, we study a mechanism design problem where borrowers share information about each other, but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts. We derive a lending mechanism which efficiently induces mutual insurance. It is necessary for borrowers to submit reports about each other to achieve efficiency. Such cross-reporting increases the bargaining power of unsuccessful borrowers, and is robust to collusion against the bank.