The Evolving Global Wine Market

Fifty years ago, a few countries in Western Europe accounted for virtually all world exports of wine and most of its production and consumption. This has changed dramatically: now every continent has major producing and/or consuming countries. Much of this change has been driven by technology and science, resulting in increasing quality, bringing new countries into the ranks of global winemakers, and increasing the productivity of traditional countries. Much of it has also been driven by economics, in particular the rising income and changing tastes of consumers throughout the world, and by public policy that has created surpluses in Europe. This paper shows the magnitudes of the shifts in consumption and production and discusses the economic and social factors that drive them.     

The value of extended delegation in dynamic agency

One of the main advantages of delegation is that specific department level information is used. Its main disadvantage is probably that central management looses direct control over certain actions. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted trade-off. We show that delegation might be favorable even if specific knowledge is completely absent. We consider a firm that lives for two periods. Due to its organizational structure part of the tasks and decision rights is inevitably delegated to a subordinate (agent). The agent performs the tasks assigned to him, tantamount to personal effort, in each of the two periods. Besides this effort the decision to implement a particular project has to be made at the beginning of period two. With regard to the project choice, central management can decide to delegate it to the agent (decentralization). Alternatively it can make it personally (centralization). If the project choice is decentralized it remains unobservable for central management. Along with second period effort it must be motivated via an incentive contract written on period output.We analyze two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. With full commitment we find that centralization is indeed favorable as compared to delegation if no informational advantage exists. This confirms conventional wisdom. However, the result does not necessarily hold with renegotiation-proof contracts. Renegotiation-proofness may force central management to set too low second-period incentives. Delegation counteracts this effect as it allows central management to implicitly commit to a higher second-period incentive rate. This arises as both, personal effort and the project choice, rather than effort alone need to be motivated. A necessary condition for too low second-period incentives, and thus for delegation to be favorable, is a negative intertemporal correlation of output.     

Breast cancer risk perceptions and breast cancer worry: what predicts what?

This longitudinal study explored the relationship between perceived breast cancer risk and worry. We measured both absolute and comparative risk perceptions, and also used the Gail algorithm to assess the accuracy of participants' risk perceptions. Three hundred and one women ages 40–75 participated in a two‐part study assessing how format of breast cancer risk presentation affected perceptions of risk. Relative to their Gail scores, women were biased pessimistically about their own absolute breast cancer risk and yet largely accurate about their comparative breast cancer risk. Perceived comparative risk, but not perceived absolute risk or biases in absolute or comparative risk, predicted subsequent worry. Worry predicted subsequent perceived absolute risk and biases in absolute and comparative risk. These results suggest that women's emotional reactions to breast cancer risk are based on accurate (unbiased) perceptions of their comparative risks. In turn, greater worry prompts a re‐evaluation of absolute risk as well as changes in risk biases. Implications for screening are discussed.     

Can Operating Leverage Be the Cause of the Value Premium?

Recent theoretical models (Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 2004) predict an association between the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) and operating leverage in the cross-section. Consistent with these models, we find a positive association between BE/ME and the degree of operating leverage (DOL), between DOL and stock returns, and between DOL and systematic risk. Overall, our findings provide support for a risk-based explanation for the value premium that is consistent with existing theoretical models. The evolution of systematic risk associated with firm-level investment activity, rather than financial distress, seems to be the main determinant of the value premium.     

Market makers as information providers: The natural experiment of STAR

Market makers are financial intermediaries who are supposed to provide additional liquidity, but do not have any information-related obligation. This paper studies the unique case of the Italian Stock Exchange, where market makers are also obliged to facilitate information disclosure about the firms they cover. We focus on a group of small/medium capitalization stocks (STAR) that are assigned a designated market maker (DMM) starting from 2001. We show that their liquidity requirements are not binding during the sample periods and that the main impact of DMMs' introduction is due to their obligations on information provision. We find that DMMs' activity as information providers reduces spread and price volatility, the probability of informed trading (PIN), and the adverse selection component of the spread. An event study provides evidence that the information released through DMMs is perceived as useful by market participants.     

丹麦风电的未来

丹麦是世界风电行业的领跑者。介绍了丹麦大力发展风电的驱动力,描述了风电发展给电力行业以及人民生活带来的影响,阐述了风电的社会经济效益。详细论述了丹麦通过负荷经济调度、电力进出口以及上下调制电能产量从而实现了电力消费的20％来自于风能。为实现欧盟的“20—20-20”目标,电网基础设施建设、灵活的生产与消费以及智能电网方案将为可再生能源尤其是风电的发展提供坚强的平台。负荷经济调度在新的方案下是实现社会经济效益最大化的有效措施。