Transactional activities and total factor productivity growth in Taiwan

Total factor productivity (TFP) growth shows how rapidly an economy is enhancing technology and the efficiency with which it allocates resources. It has been argued that “miraculous” growth in East Asian economies may not be sustainable, due to relatively low rates of TFP growth. Among these economies, it appears that Taiwan has indeed exhibited substantial technological progress. Failure to control for transactional activities, however, can distort the impression of TFP growth. This study recalculates Taiwan's TFP growth for the 1957–1993 sample period, adjusting for transaction costs in the government and private sectors. For the early years of the sample, 1957–1973, the economy's technological progress is better than GDP-based calculations suggest. In recent years, 1983–1993, productivity improvement has been overstated, but the economy has still exhibited relatively fast TFP growth.     

Trade policy under imperfect competition: The economics of Russian roulette

Summary Neo-classical economic theory shows that managed trade or protectionism is (almost) always welfare decreasing. However, measurements of the welfare costs of protectionism based on neo-classical models seem to suggest that these costs are quite small. We discuss general new insights and developments in the theory, policy and empiricism of international trade. The observation that intra-industry trade and the services sector are important has led to a shift in theory away from constant returns to scale and perfect competition towards economies of scale and scope, externalities, market imperfections, and imperfect competition. Although this, in principle, opens the door to beneficial government intervention in the economic process, we emphasize that the true costs of protection can potentially be much higher than is generally acknowledged as a result of the above mentioned shift.We would like to thank, without implicating, Martin Fase, Harry Garretsen, Catrinus Jepma, Simon Kuipers, Ger Lanjouw, Tenn Schmidt, Albert de Vaal, and Jean-Marie Viaene for stimulating conversations and useful suggestions. We thank Thijs Knaap for excellent research assistance.     

Firm-specific cost savings and market power

Summary. We report a policy experiment that illustrates a potential problem of using historical pass-through rates as a means of predicting the competitive consequences of projected firm-specific cost savings in antitrust contexts, particularly in merger analysis. The effects of cost savings on welfare can vary vastly, depending on how the savings affect the industry supply schedule. In a capacity-constrained price-setting oligopoly, we observe that cost savings can overwhelm behaviorally salient market power incentives when the savings affect marginal (high cost) units. However, cost savings of the same magnitude on an infra-marginal unit leave market power unchanged.     

A Tale of Two Models: Comparing structuralist and neoclassical computable general equilibrium models for South Africa

This paper compares two working models of the South African economy, an orthodox, neoclassical computable general equilibrium model in which savings drive investment, and a more structuralist, eclectic, model for which there is an independent investment function. Both models are calibrated to the same social accounting matrix. Comparative statics of simplified prototype models are presented and identical simulations with the corresponding applied versions are compared. It is seen that the neoclassical model fully supports the principles of the 'Washington Consensus' while the structuralist model requires a far more heterodox set of policies to avoid slow growth or high inflation.     

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Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games

This paper reports evidence on the origin of convention in laboratory cohorts confronting similar but not identical strategic situations repeatedly. The experiment preserves the action space of the game, while randomly perturbing the payoffs and scrambling the action labels in an effort to blunt the salience of retrospective selection principles. Hence, the similarity between stage games is reduced to certain strategic details, like efficiency, security, and risk dominance. Nevertheless, we do observe conventions emerging in half of the laboratory cohorts. When a convention emerges subjects's behavior conforms to the selection principles of efficiency rather than security or risk dominance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83.     

Auditor Fees, Market Microstructure, and Firm Transparency

Abstract:  Auditors, as corporate insiders, have access to private information regarding the firm's financial and business opacity that is unavailable to outside investors. We test whether auditors price their knowledge of firm opacity in their audit fees by examining two competing hypotheses. The first states that higher audit fees may reflect the greater risk that the auditor faces in auditing an opaque firm. Under this hypothesis, market based measures of opacity will be positively correlated with higher fees. The second hypothesis states that firms buy reputational capital from their auditor by paying high fees in an attempt to improve the market's perception of the firm's transparency. In this case, higher audit fees are negatively correlated with market based measures of opacity. Our results are consistent with the first hypothesis, that auditors price opacity risk into their fees.