The Model of a Gender-Segregated Low-Income Economy Reconsidered: Evidence from Uganda

This paper examines Darity's model of gender-segregated low-income agrarian society in light of evidence from Uganda. It identifies three important features of the interactions between men and women which are likely to have economic effects but which are subsumed within Darity's schematic presentation. It suggests a reformulation of the Darity model in terms of a bargaining framework. This facilitates greater insights into gendered economic processes that otherwise are ignored, and investigation of a wider range of macro outcomes.     

“Buy-back” in international trade: A rationale

Conclusion When a technology proprietor cannot exploit his advantage by means of ownership of a production facility abroad, a sales contract with “buy-back provisions” may, in fact, be a trade-enhancing resolution to a situation of information-asymmetry between buyer and seller. The important implication is that not all forms of countertrade can be summarily dismissed as inefficient. Just as foreign direct investment can be seen to be a response to environmental or market imperfections, “buy-back” may be a way to deal with institutional or regulatory obstacles such as the prohibition of foreign ownership.     

Determining the economic gains from regulation at the extensive and intensive margins

Among the second-best approaches for the regulation of pollution,little attention has been paid to the distorting effect of intensivemargin policies on the extensive margin. This article shows,within a dynamic framework, that regulation of the intensivemargin has to be complemented by regulation of the extensivemargin. Depending on the elasticity of the pollution functionwith respect to nitrogen use, the appropriate regulation atthe extensive margin is zero, a tax or a subsidy. We show empiricallythat combining a nitrogen tax with land-use taxes is about 18per cent more cost efficient than a nitrogen tax alone and 58per cent more efficient than off-site abatement in the formof groundwater treatment.     

The Common Heritage Principle:

A bstract An effort is underway to apply the common heritage principle to certain unique global resources while promoting economic development Under this precept, property rights to such resources are said to belong to all nations and their citizens rather than being subject to national sovereignty The doctrine is examined in theory and as applied in the outer space and law of the sea treaties Its possible application to Antarctica is explored in relationship to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) which is now considering a minerals regime for the continent Assessing the international political situation suggests the powerful bloc of ATS nations will ignore the common heritage principle However, a different outcome is possible, given a convergence of the Antarctic mining and global atmospheric issues of the greenhouse and ozone varieties Under this scenario, the global atmosphere and Antarctica would be common property resources whose property rights are owned by all nations     

Nostalgia versus Pragmatism? How attitudes and interests shape the term sustainable agriculture in Switzerland and New Zealand

National public debates on sustainable agriculture are often framed by the respective attitudes and interests of the dominant stakeholders involved.     

First‐price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure

Although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two‐bidder first‐price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret, the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed. Nevertheless, we construct a behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure that is equivalent to the pure separating equilibrium under no disclosure. Thus, if the bidders follow this equilibrium, the choice of the disclosure regime does not affect the final allocation of the item nor the expected payoffs.     

Using International Institutions to Improve Public Procurement

The World Trade Organization's voluntary rules on governmentprocurement are a useful mechanism for ensuring that publicprocurement procedures are efficient. They also provide an opportunityto reduce the uncertainty of participants by increasing transparencyand accountability. Yet most developing countries have chosennot to subject their procurement policies to international disciiplinesand multilateral surveillance. Their reasons may include anunfamiliarity with the government procurement agreement (GPA);a perception that the potential payoffs are small; a desireto discriminate in favor of domestic firms; or the successfulopposition of groups that benefit from the current regimes.Although the economic rationales for abstaining from the GPAare not compelling, a quid pro quo for accession may be neededto overcome opposition by special interests. Developing countryprocurement markets are large enough that governments may beable to make accession to the GPA conditional on temporary exceptionsto multilateral disczplines or on better access to export markets.