Is the Income Elasticity of the Willingness to Pay for Pollution Control Constant?

How willingness to pay for environmental quality changes as incomes rise is a central question in several areas of environmental economics. This paper explores both theoretically and empirically whether or not the willingness to pay (WTP) for pollution control varies with income. Our model indicates that the income elasticity of the marginal WTP for pollution reduction is only constant under very restrictive conditions. Our empirical analysis tests the null hypothesis that the elasticity of the WTP for pollution control with respect to income is constant, employing a multi-country contingent valuation study of eutrophication reduction in the Baltic Sea. Our findings reject this hypothesis, and estimate an income elasticity of the WTP for eutrophication control of 0.1–0.2 for low-income respondents and 0.6–0.7 for high-income respondents. Thus, our empirical results suggest that the elasticity is not constant but is always less than one. This has implications for how benefits transfer exercises, and for theoretical explanations of the environmental Kuznets curve.     

HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION ON HOSPITAL FINANCIAL OUTCOMES

This study examines the effect of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion on hospital financial outcomes. A key innovation relative to prior studies is that we explicitly account for heterogeneity across states in the timing and extent of the expansion as well as across hospital types. We find that Medicaid expansion led to a decrease in uncompensated care expenditures and an increase in average operating margins. The effects were larger in states where the Medicaid expansion led to a greater increase in program eligibility. Operating margins improved most for public hospitals and facilities located in rural areas. (JEL I11, I13, I18)     

Competition and Public Policy in the Nursing Home Industry

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole lifecycle of a property right: How it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and almost completely neglected the question of initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible hand function of the market — the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean," but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then, the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven, which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle — i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. I show that the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results), and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another — as is readily recognized when an employer and employee together commit a crime).¹     

First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders

We study first-price auctions with resale when there are many bidders and derive existence and characterization results under the assumption that the winner of the initial auction runs a second-price auction with an optimal reserve price. The fact that symmetrization fails when there are more than two bidders has been observed before, but we also provide the direction: weaker bidders are less likely to win than stronger ones. For a special class of distributions and three bidders, we prove that the bid distributions are more symmetric with resale than without. Numerical simulations suggest that the more bidders there are, the more similar the allocation is to the case without resale, and thus, the more asymmetric the bid distributions are between strong and weak bidders. We also show in an example that the revenue advantage of first-price auctions over second-price auctions is positive, but decreasing in the number of bidders.     

Controlling Episodic Air Pollution with a Seasonal Gas Tax: The Case of Cache Valley,Utah

Using daily data spanning 10 years, we establish a statistical relationship between episodic particulate-matter \((\hbox {PM}_{2.5})\) concentrations and vehicle trips in Cache Valley, Utah, and estimate an average gas-price elasticity for the region. We also estimate the benefits and costs associated with a seasonal gas tax set to reduce vehicle trips during the winter-inversion season and thereby lower health costs through concomitant decreases in the \(\hbox {PM}_{2.5}\) concentrations. We find a strong positive relationship between vehicle trips reduced and associated reductions in \(\hbox {PM}_{2.5}\) concentrations. Further, we estimate a mean gas price elasticity of approximately \(-\)0.3 in what we call a “high price variability environment.” Incorporating these results, cost-benefit analysis suggests that the social net benefit for Cache Valley associated with the imposition of a seasonal gas tax during the winter-inversion season is highly dependent upon the type of benefit estimation method used.     

Turning the page? EU fiscal consolidation in the wake of the crisis

The fiscal cost of the financial and economic crisis in Europe is huge. The paper provides provisional estimates of this cost and looks at its implications for the sustainability of public finances, taking into account also the impact of aging populations. The historical experience suggests that economic growth is persistently lowered in the aftermath of financial crisis, making fiscal consolidation more difficult yet all the more essential. Meanwhile the timing of the exit from fiscal stimulus and subsequent fiscal consolidation must reconcile sustainability and stabilisation goals—a delicate balancing act. The paper will argue in favour of structural reform to boost the economic growth potential alongside fiscal consolidation. The fiscal coordination framework in the EU, together with the Europe 2020 strategy, is seen to underpin this approach.     

Specialists and citizens all: A reply to Boettke,Koppl, and Holcombe

Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas. From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers.     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungÜbersetzt von Gerhard Tintner, WienÜbersetzt von Ragnar Nurkse, z. Zt. Wienaus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Dr. Hans Fried, WienÜbersetzt von Paul Brüll, Wien.Aus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Dr. Hans Fried.     

Rock Paper Scissors

Rock Paper Scissors is used to resolve conflict when a compromise is not possible. Individuals playing ``games' tend to have biases they prefer to play. I show that Rock Paper Scissors with biased players results in a player with a high valuation for winning being victorious with a probability greater than a player with a low valuation. Thus, it frequently achieves the efficient outcome. Furthermore, as the benefit to victory increases for all players, victory for each player becomes equally likely. Therefore, it is often efficient for minor conflicts while it performs no better than a coin-flip for major conflicts.