Managerial Legacies,Entrenchment, and Strategic Inertia

This paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm's strategy is an important determinant of CEO compensation, turnover, and strategy change. A legacy makes CEO replacement expensive, because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager. Boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched. Moreover, when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the CEO, because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail. Even though CEOs have no specific skills in our model, legacy issues can explain the empirical association between CEO and strategy change.     

On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Production in the State of Nature

I analyse the emergence of property rights in a model of conflict and production in the absence of institutions of enforcement. The population of agents evolves dynamically through conflicts for possession of factor goods among pairs of randomly matched agents. Conflicts are incomplete information wars of attrition with an agent's type consisting of his or her independently drawn valuation of the prize and cost of competing for it. I prove equilibrium existence and show that in the steady state of the game, the population sorts into two stable groups (resource "haves" and "have-nots") in accordance with a known function of their primitive types.     

BASKET PEGS AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CHANGE: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN THE MID‐SEVENTIES*

The adoption of a basket peg by China in July 2005 raised interest in this form of exchange rate regime. This paper explores the emergence of the basket peg in the early 1970s, using New Zealand and Australia as case studies to examine why it was adopted, how it operated, and their policy‐makers' use of it to influence various goals. We highlight the complexity of regime choice following the collapse of Bretton Woods. For Australia and New Zealand, the basket peg was a plausible (although interim) solution when they were reluctant either to peg to a single currency or float.     

Equilibrium Bitcoin Pricing

We offer a general equilibrium analysis of cryptocurrency pricing. The fundamental value of the cryptocurrency is its stream of net transactional benefits, which depend on its future prices. This implies that, in addition to fundamentals, equilibrium prices reflect sunspots. This in turn implies multiple equilibria and extrinsic volatility, that is, cryptocurrency prices fluctuate even when fundamentals are constant. To match our model to the data, we construct indices measuring the net transactional benefits of Bitcoin. In our calibration, part of the variations in Bitcoin returns reflects changes in net transactional benefits, but a larger share reflects extrinsic volatility.