Resource allocation in a general equilibrium model of production under uncertainty: The case of variable supply of labor

This paper examines the effects of a marginal change in uncertainty on resource allocation and factor rewards by relaxing the assumption of factor inelasticity. We demonstrate that integrating a variable labor supply into Batra's two-sector uncertainty model can mitigate or reverse many of the earlier results. Specifically, a marginal increase in uncertainty may trigger the resource to move from the certainty sector to the uncertainty sector in the presence of a backward-bending labor supply curve.     

The Resource Dependence, Service and Control Functions of Boards of Directors in Hong Kong and Taiwanese Firms

Since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990's, there have been numerous calls for the reform of East Asian corporate governance. Without reform, fears abound that the crisis will return. However, a baseline understanding of corporate governance in East Asia needs to be established before reform efforts can begin. In the West, three major functions of boards are commonly recognized: resource dependence, service, and control. These functions have yet to be examined in the context of boards of directors of Overseas Chinese firms in East Asia. In this exploratory study, we examine the extent to which these functions are performed, primarily by outside board members, in Overseas Chinese firms in Hong Kong and Taiwan. We find that the service and control functions are less pronounced for East Asian boards than what would be expected in the West, while the resource dependence function is more pronounced. We also findthat the governance of the region is being moved closer to international practices by a new generation of leaders that have been exposed to Western influences and intense global competition. The implications of our findings for managers, educators, and researchers are discussed.     

Foreign competition and optimal privatization with excess burden of taxation

We examine in a mixed oligopoly setting how foreign competition and the excess burden of taxation will affect privatization policy in the presence of strategic tax/subsidy policies. We show that in the presence of excess burden of taxation with foreign competitors, output subsidy coupled with import tariff and partial privatization is adopted to improve the social welfare. However, if the excess burden of taxation is relatively large, the government may switch to use production tax coupled with tariff policy and partial privatization to improve the social welfare.     

Image and cost factors in the choice of mental health-care organizations: A causal model

The importance of image as a determinant of choice has been demonstrated for banks, supermarkets, hospitals and other service organizations, but not in the instance of mental health-care providers. Based on a mail survey of residents of a medium-sized metropolitan area, this study explores the components of image for mental health-care institutions. A causal model is hypothesized and validated, specifying the relationships between preferences towards mental health-care institutions, with image and cost factors as potential determinants. The findings suggest that cost does not play a significant role in the choice of mental health providers, whereas image has a significant impact.     

Graduate overeducation as a sheepskin effect: evidence from Northern Ireland

This article examines the nature of graduate overeducation amongst a group of applicants to a graduate conversion programme. It was found that while a substantial proportion of earnings differentials were associated with a mismatch between individual skill levels and job requirements, wage gaps were still likely to occur should such mismatches be eliminated. The evidence suggests that graduate wage levels are heavily related to sheepskin effects associated with the attainment of jobs with graduate level entry requirements. These sheepskin effects suggest that the process of job categorization is arbitrary in nature, with stated job requirements somewhat independent of actual skill requirements. The analysis suggests that graduate overeduction is better understood within the context of both skill and categorization mismatches as opposed to skill matches alone.     

Evidence of Stock Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume: A Threshold Quantile Regression Approach

This paper presents a capital asset pricing model‐based threshold quantile regression model with a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic specification to examine relations between excess stock returns and “abnormal trading volume”. We employ an adaptive Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo method with asymmetric Laplace distribution to study six daily Dow Jones Industrial stocks. The proposed model captures asymmetric risk through market beta and volume coefficients, which change discretely between regimes. Moreover, they are driven by market information and various quantile levels. This study finds that abnormal volume has significantly negative effects on excess stock returns under low quantile levels; however, there are significantly positive effects under high quantile levels. The evidence indicates that each market beta varies with different quantile levels, capturing different states of market conditions.     

LABOR TURNOVER IN THE USA AND JAPAN: A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES

Abstract. The labor turnover rate in Japan is less than half the US level. A small-scale survey of companies that operate in both Japan and the USA was conducted to examine reasons for the discrepancy. The main findings are that Japanese human resource policies, including steep seniority-earnings profiles, extensive fringe benefits, participatory management, and a reluctance to recruit experienced workers from other firms, contribute to the lower Japanese turnover rate. Additionally, workers of Japanese descent in the USA have a somewhat lower labor turnover rate than other Americans, suggesting some role for cultural differences.     

Seller competition by mechanism design

This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and converges to zero in the limit. We study how the surplus of buyers and sellers depends on the number of agents on each side of the market in this decentralized trading environment.