Commercial Real Estate Market Property Level Capital Expenditures: An Options Analysis

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Option pricing theory predicts that capital improvement expenditures are positively linked with high or increasing market lease rates. Ceteris...     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

Q-analytics: An ethics case on unlicensed software usage

This short role-taking ethics case is designed to provide students with several different perspectives related to the unauthorized/unlicensed use of software within a realistic accounting setting. Although the case could be considered for use in a variety of accounting classes at both undergraduate and graduate levelswith limited preparation, it is likely to be most relevant to Accounting Information Systems, Auditing, Controllership, and Accounting Ethics courses. The case can be read in about ten minutes, after which the class is assigned to groups that deliberate over the concerns of six different roles regarding the software-usage issues implied in the case.The issues are relevant to the students because they will inevitably encounter software-usage problems in their personal or professional lives. Furthermore, they inevitably have been exposed to similar copyright-infringement issues in the realms of music and video, which helps make for a rich class discussion.The case has consistently generated considerable discussion and debate within a graduate-level controllership course. A survey of students from five graduate accounting classes over a three-year period indicates favorable perceptions of the case.     

Global style momentum

We first document the empirical regularity of significant style-level momentum returns in international data. Then we test some Barberis and Shleifer (2003) propositions regarding style momentum. One proposition holds that Sharpe ratios from style-level momentum strategies should be at least as large as stock-level momentum Sharpe ratios. We test for style-level momentum profitability in our sample of global markets and find some evidence of larger style momentum Sharpe ratios, especially within the value-growth style. However, most of the evidence favors stock momentum. The Barberis and Shleifer (2003) model also suggests that style momentum could be time-varying. Variables that effectively condition stock momentum are much less effective with style momentum.     

Underwriting and investment risks in the property-liability insurance industry: evidence prior to the 9–11 event

Underwriting and investment are two important and related business activities of insurance companies. However, studies on the interrelation between underwriting and investment risks of Property-Liability (P-L) insurance companies are sparse in the literature. Using a sample of US P-L insurers, this article conducts an empirical investigation of how these two risks are associated with each other in the 1994–2000 period (before the September 11th terrorist attack in 2001). Our results, robust to various estimations, suggest that there is no significant relationship between the underwriting and investment risks among our sample firms. Such results based on pre 9–11 event period provide some support for the conjecture of Achleitner et al. (Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract 27:275–282, 2002) that many insurance companies may have failed to take an integrated approach to risk management. This resulted in a heavy loss due to dual exposures in both underwriting and investment in the 9–11 event. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, risk taking and risk management of financial institutions have received more attention and increasing scrutiny. We believe the current paper provides some useful insights in this vein.     

Do actions speak louder than words? An empirical investigation of corporate environmental reputation

In this study, we investigate the extent to which firms’ environmental performance is reflected in perceptions of their environmental reputation and whether environmental disclosure serves to mediate the negative aspects of poorer environmental performance associated with those assessments. We also examine whether differences in environmental performance and environmental disclosure appear to be associated with membership selection to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), a factor we also believe may be associated with perceptions of environmental reputation. Based on a cross-sectional sample of 92 US firms from environmentally sensitive industries, we find that environmental performance measured using Trucost environmental performance scores is negatively related to both reputation scores and membership in the DJSI. We argue this is due to the more extensive disclosure levels of firms that are worse performers and the finding of a significant positive relation between environmental disclosure and both the environmental reputation measures and DJSI membership. Finally, we show that the DJSI designation positively influences perceptions of corporate reputation. Overall, our results suggest that voluntary environmental disclosure appears to mediate the effect of poor environmental performance on environmental reputation. Perhaps more troubling, our results also suggest that membership in the DJSI appears to be driven more by what firms say than what they do. Thus, like voluntary disclosure, the DJSI may actually be hindering improved future corporate environmental performance.     

Audit opinion improvement and the timing of disclosure

Companies have been found to report positive information more quickly than they report negative information (i.e., good news early, bad news late). This paper investigates the potential impact of audit opinion change on the timeliness of financial disclosures, with improvements in audit opinion considered to be “good news.” We take both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change into consideration, with magnitude measuring how far the opinion is from an unqualified opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph is closer to an unqualified opinion than a qualified opinion is). We find that firms experiencing an improvement in their audit opinions disclose their financial results earlier, while those with audit opinion deteriorations report their financial results later, and that these effects were related to the magnitude of the opinion change. What's more, there is an asymmetric response to good audit opinion news vs. bad audit opinion news, with bad audit opinion news having a larger effect on earnings timeliness than the effect on earnings timeliness of good audit opinion news. Overall, our results support the “good news early, bad news late” notion. Finally, we also find that overall earnings timeliness has improved in China since the enactment of new reporting regulations in 2006.     

Seven Ways to Deal with a Financial Crisis: Cross‐Country Experience and Policy Implications1

This article presents a taxonomy of financial restructuring strategies that have been used by national policy makers to manage financial crises in the past. The goals of financial restructuring are to preserve or, if necessary, restore the debtor‐creditor relationships on which the economy depends for efficient allocation of capital, and to do so at minimal cost. Costs include not only the direct costs to taxpayers of financial assistance, but also—and likely more important—the indirect costs to the economy that stem from misallocations of capital and incentive problems resulting from the restructuring. Countries typically apply a combination of tools, including decentralized, market‐based mechanisms as well as government‐managed programs. Market‐based strategies generally aim to strengthen the capital base of financial institutions and borrowers using some mix of debt forgiveness and capital infusions. Government‐led restructuring strategies include the establishment of entities to which non‐performing loans are transferred as well as government‐assisted sales of domestic financial institutions, often to foreign entrants. Market‐based mechanisms can provide low‐cost ways of resolving the coordination problems faced by countries in the wake of massive debtor and creditor insolvency, particularly when those mechanisms are effective in achieving the desirable objective of selectivity—that is, devoting taxpayer resources only to those borrowers and banks that, with temporary assistance, will be capable of sustaining themselves in the future. But limiting their range of application mainly to developed economies, such market‐based mechanisms also depend on an efficient judicial system, a credible supervisory framework and authority with sufficient enforcement capacity, and lack of corruption in implementation. Although government‐managed programs may not seem to depend as heavily on well‐functioning legal and regulatory institutions, such approaches—especially the transfer of assets to government‐owned asset management companies—also rely to some extent on such institutions. Asset management companies are less likely to achieve their goal of resolving the overhang of debt at reasonable cost when legal and political institutions are weak and ownership of domestic creditors and debtors is highly concentrated. Especially in such cases, complexity and failure to consider incentive problems when designing specific rules governing financial assistance can aggravate moral hazard problems, unnecessarily raising the costs of resolution. Resolution mechanisms tend to be most successful when—like across‐the‐board debt forgiveness programs implemented through redenominations of debt—they are simple in design and afford quick resolution of outstanding debts, offering little discretion to governments while providing incentives for the private sector to work down the remaining debt overhang.