Stability of money demand function revisited in China

As China's economic reforms have undergone significant structural changes after 1979, it has been rather difficult to formulate a stable money demand function over the period following that year. While previous literature on the long-run relationship of money demand in China shows the existence of stable money demand, this article revisits the stability of the China money demand function over the period after 1979. To employ the unit root tests and the cointegration tests with structural break, the empirical evidence demonstrates that economic and financial deregulation did affect the stability of demand for money in China over the period 1977 to 2002. Moreover, the estimated long-run income and interest elasticity are respectively 1.01 (1.11) and ?0.14 (?0.08) using the real M1 (M2) equation. In addition, real income and the interest rate are found to be weakly exogenous. We overall do find structural breakpoints mainly in 1980 and 1993, and they look to match clearly with corresponding critical financial and economic incidents.     

Economic effects of positive credit information sharing: the case of Korea

In many countries, in addition to negative credit information such as loan default and arrears, positive credit information is also exchanged on a voluntary and reciprocal basis. Employing optimal credit decision models of profit maximizing banks, and utilizing a unique dataset of 2?million consumer loan obligors in Korea, we investigate the economic effects of sharing positive credit information in addition to negative credit information already exchanged. We find that the discriminatory power of the credit scoring model improves significantly. We proceed to investigate the economic effects of the information gap in a competitive credit market by assuming two representative banks that differ only in the level of credit information sharing. The bank that utilizes negative information only suffers from deterioration of the borrower pool and reduced profit, as high credit risk borrowers are more concentrated on this bank due to underpricing of risks. Our finding suggests that banks have incentives to voluntarily participate in the positive information sharing mechanism, since even a small difference in discriminatory power stemming from the information gap may lead to a significant fall in profitability as the distribution of borrower quality changes endogenously due to adverse selection problems.     

Foreign ownership and the credibility of national rating agencies: Evidence from Korea

By analyzing bond price reactions to rating changes in Korea, this study adds a new angle to the existing literature on Global Rating Agencies (GRAs, i.e. Moody’s, S&P’s, Fitch) with higher reputation/independence vs. National Rating Agencies (NRAs) with more in-depth local knowledge. Faced with substantial regulatory burdens, GRAs have chosen to operate indirectly in the Korean domestic market by acquiring local NRAs. In our event study, cumulative abnormal returns following downgrades by a wholly domestically owned NRA tend to dominate those from downgrades by two affiliates of GRAs. This casts doubt on the additional information value of reputation capital acquired through GRA ownership as perceived by emerging markets.     

Why Any Seatbelt Mandate is an Infinitely Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Health Economics Perspective

Abstract

Among the most controversial of public health measures are those that restrict people’s freedom of choice presumably for the purpose of protecting their own health and safety. Mandatory use of automobile seatbelts can inspire allusions to the “tyranny of health” and the ‘health police.” This study revisits state seatbelt legislation, which is in force in all but one state of the USA. In modeling seatbelt mandates as indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games, the study qualifies and overcomes the limitations of conventional interest group and expressive voting theories. It indicates why and how utility-maximizing players, particularly carmakers, insurance companies, consumer advocates and regulators, may choose to cooperate, even in instances where mutual defection would bring each of them higher payoffs. The study suggests why state seatbelt mandates endure, despite ongoing concerns that they undermine individual autonomy or that their social costs outweigh the benefits of law-enforcement. The evolution and mediating effects of reputation and reciprocity in otherwise highly contestable healthcare decisions are consequently explored. Finally, the study identifies the implications of indefinitely repeated games on the continuing nature of strategic relationships and for mitigating conflict over traffic safety regulation, regardless of time and place.     

Heterodox Economics and its Critics

Heterodox economics has its critics. Most of the criticisms are friendly comments and analysis directed towards improving heterodox economic theory. However, the critics and their criticisms that are the concern of this article are the ones that challenge the existence of heterodox economic theory and the community of heterodox economists as manifested through their graduate programs, conferences, journals and identity. These critics observe that the academic status quo in economics, as manifested in its department and journal rankings, rules of academic engagement, and its institutions and organizations, favor mainstream economics and that it is unlikely to change in the future. Consequently, they argue that heterodox economists can survive only if they become more like mainstream economists. With focus on assimilation, the critics direct their criticisms towards the social characteristics of the heterodox community and to the personal characteristics of heterodox economists. This article is a response to the critics.     

R&D Investments,Information and Strategy

This paper argues that firms can best realize the value of their investments in R&D by exploiting the associated information asymmetries. Attention is directed away from the physical results of R&D and towards the firm's ability, more generally, to earn rents from the private information emanating from its R&D. Four strategies may be used to exploit the information asymmetries from R&D: (1) publish the details of the innovation in return for legal protection; (2) keep the information inside the firm; (3) make the information selectively, informally available to others; and (4) disseminate the information as widely and rapidly as possible. To implement these strategies, resources may be allocated both to the commercial development of new technologies, and/or to related market opportunities (investing in other companies, assets and technologies). Of critical importance are the innovator's own skills and resources in effectively gathering, understanding, and commercially exploiting R&D-generated information asymmetries, both internally and in relation to other firms. This study should yield new insights to managers in designing strategies (and counter-strategies) to position themselves not only at the technological edge, but more fundamentally, at the 'information edge'.     

Constrained output maximization and US agriculture

This paper presents a framework for estimating an indirect production function and then applies it to aggregate US agriculture. Issues addressed include tests of standard hypotheses about the underlying technology (homotheticity, neutral technical change, etc.) as well as examination of consistency in aggregation and the effects of changes in the level of aggregate expenditure on farm output. Since there already exist several studies empirically describing agricultural production technologies with indirect objective functions, one might fairly ask whether this paper really breaks any new ground? We feel that it does. One reason is that existing studies (e.g. Binswanger, 1974; Lopez, 1980; Ball and Chambers, 1982; Ray, 1982; and Weaver, 1983) all rely on either profit or cost functions. To date there appears to be only one study using an indirect production (Appelbaum, 1979), and it is not in agriculture. This seems unfortunate because there are many instances in agriculture for which an indirect production function (or revenue function approach) seems more appropriate. The reason why relates directly to one's belief about the objective function and constraints farmers face. Ultimately, it seems plausible in a certainty framework that producers maximize profits. And since cost minimization and output maximization are just constrained versions of profit maximization, both cost and indirect production functions are more appropriately viewed as restricted profit functions. What differs is the constraint. Assuming cost minimization implies that farmers are constrained by a fixed output which they must produce; in most instances, this is implausible. More likely, the level of output is itself a choice variable. Output maximization, on the other hand, suggests that the main constraint is the amount of money that producers can muster to hire resources. In other words, farmers may face binding constraints in obtaining the profit maximizing level on expenditure on input utilization. One might think that expenditure may not be a binding constraint because there exists a relatively active US credit market. However, the US credit market is far from being perfectly competitive in a stylized sense, and thus, the possibility of a farmer being able to finance a given level of expenditure may be limited.

Readers familiar with the dual approach to production problems may already be asking why these ideas rule out cost functions since it is well known that the cost function is the distance function of the indirect production function (Blackorby et al., 1978)? In principle, therefore, one could always estimate a cost function and then invert it to obtain the indirect production function. There are two problems with this approach: the first is that if output maximization is truly the objective, output is not predetermined and cannot be treated as exogenous in cost function estimation. Second, estimation of direct and indirect functions using the same data set does not always yield comparable results. Estimation of a transcendental logarithmic (translog) indirect production function and a translog cost function, separately, does not generally yield identical estimates of the Allen elasticities of substitutions. Solving the first problem in simple, but the second suggests that estimation should proceed on the basis of the objective function the researcher deems most appropriate. Therefore, if output maximization is more plausible than cost minimization an indirect production function should be used.

The plan of the paper is as follows. We first outline the theoretical developments necessary to our approach (included are conditions necessary for consistent aggregation over firms). We then present estimates of an indirect production function and use these estimates to investigate the plausibility of various restrictions on the technology, consistency in aggregation, substitution possibilities in agricultural production, and the effect of expenditure on agricultural input utilization. The paper closes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for future research.     

Understanding the adoption of new brands through salespeople: a multilevel framework

So far there has been scant empirical attention paid to the role of the sales force in the adoption of new brands in the early implementation stages. We test a framework of internal (sales manager and salespeople) brand adoption using an empirical multilevel study. Our findings suggest that the construct of expected customer demand (ECD) plays an important role in sales force brand adoption. First, ECD directly influences salespeople’s and sales managers’ brand adoption. Second, ECD serves as a cross-level moderator of new brand adoption transmission. We find the influence of sales managers’ brand adoption on salespeople’s brand adoption to be stronger when salespeople’s ECD is lower.     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.