Formalisation of land rights: Some empirical evidence from Mali, Niger and South Africa

In this paper, we re-interpret three cases of research previously carried out in Mali, Niger and South Africa in light of the recent debate about formalisation of land rights that has emerged since the publication of Hernando de Soto's ‘Mystery of Capital’. The Malian case shows that lack of broad access to formalisation processes in high-pressure areas may play into the hands of those with power, information, and resources. The case also demonstrates that timing of formalisation efforts in urban areas characterised by rapid expansion is crucial in terms of distributive outcomes. The Nigerien case demonstrates how impending formalisation led to a scramble for land and increased conflicts in a context of institutional competition and limited administrative capacity. The South African case shows that the very process of surveying and registering rights may also change the rights themselves. Formalisation procedures may also amplify the tension between individual and communal rights, and boost privatisation.     

Local Government,Spatial Spillovers and the Absorption of EU Structural Funds

The allocation of regional policy funds varies dramatically across regions even when one controls for regional development indicators. We investigate the impact of local government performance as well as spillovers in knowledge, financial means and social relations as determinants of regional fund absorption. Government performance is derived within a Data Envelopment Analysis approach. Spillovers are investigated using a spatial Durbin model. Results show that government performance has a positive impact on fund absorption. Spillovers occur in knowledge as well as in financial means. The empirical analyses focus on Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development in Slovakia using panel data.     

Are financial development and corruption control substitutes in promoting growth?

While financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively, their interaction has not. We develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects, but act as substitutes in doing so. The substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent; conversely, financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it. We test this substitutability by predicting growth, of countries and industries, using measures of financial development, lack of corruption, and a key interaction term. Both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor, as well as to a substitutability between them. The growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0.63–1.68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th. The results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers, omitted variables, or other theories of growth and convergence.     

Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants

Contest rules are set up by administrators who frequently have discretionary power in specifying the details of these rules, i.e., they can bias the contest rules toward specific contestants in order to further their prime objective. We derive the optimal bias of the contest rule for a contest administrator, who is interested in maximizing the total efforts expended in the contest. The solution is obtained in closed form for a widely used class of n-person contest games. Setting the optimal bias has important implications: (i) there is never exclusion of strong players, instead there is (endogenously induced) inclusion of weak contestants; (ii) the contest administrator will optimally level the playing field by encouraging weak contestants, but he will not equalize the contestants’ chances unless they are identical; and (iii) at least three contestants will be active in equilibrium of the optimal contest, irrespective of heterogeneity.     

What drives inflation in New Keynesian models?

This paper estimates variants of a small-scale New Keynesian model using observations on inflation, inflation expectations and nominal interest rates. We ask whether those variables alone can tell us something about the time series properties of real marginal costs.     

Some unfamiliar dynamics of a familiar macro model a note

The idea that for small disturbances the full employment equilibrium is stable while for large disturbances it is unstable was coined by Leijonhufvud in the notion of a corridor. We discuss the existence of a corridor in the standard Keynesian-monetarist textbook macro-model. It turns out that though the full employment steady state of this model may be locally stable — which is the case when the well-known Cagan condition holds — the model is never globally stable. This is due to the inherent non-linearity in the demand for money function, arising from non-negativity of the nominal rate of interest. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, the Cagan condition is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a corridor in the Keynesian-monetarist model.This note is adapted from a paper presented at the European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Bologna, August 1988. I would like to thank Søren Bo Nielsen and Peter Birch Sørensen (Copenhagen Business School), Thomas Lux (University of Bamberg), and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors and shortcomings are mine.     

Wages, Experience and Seniority

In this paper we study the sources of wage growth. We identify the contribution to such growth of general, sector specific and firm specific human capital. Our results are interpretable within the context of a model where the returns to human capital may be heterogeneous and where firms may offer different combinations of entry level wages and firm specific human capital development. We allow for the possibility that wages are match specific and that workers move jobs as a result of identifying a better match. To estimate the average returns to experience, sector tenure and firm specific tenure within this context, we develop an identification strategy which relies on the use of firm closures. Our data source is a new and unique administrative data-set for Germany that includes complete work histories as well as individual characteristics. We find positive returns to experience and firm tenure for skilled workers. The returns to experience for unskilled workers are small and insignificant after 2 years of experience. Their returns to sector tenure are also zero. However, their returns to firm tenure are substantial.     

Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion.     

Probabilistic Bounds on the Virtual Multipliers in Data Envelopment Analysis: Polyhedral Cone Constraints

The paper is concerned with the incorporation of polyhedral cone constraints on the virtual multipliers in DEA. The incorporation of probabilistic bounds on the virtual multipliers based upon a stochastic benchmark vector is demonstrated. The suggested approach involves a stochastic (chance constrained) programming model with multipliers constrained to the cone spanned by confidence intervals for the components of the stochastic benchmark vector at varying probability levels. Consider a polyhedral assurance region based upon bounded pairwise ratios between multipliers. It is shown that in general it is never possible to identify a center-vector defined as a vector in the interior of the cone with identical angles to all extreme rays spanning the cone. Smooth cones are suggested if an asymmetric variation in the set of feasible relative prices is to be avoided.