Current Account Adjustment in the Eurozone: Lessons From a Flexible Price Model

This paper discusses the desired size of the internal devaluation in the Eurozone for a scenario of current account adjustment induced by shifts in relative demand. Based on Obstfeld and Rogoff, I develop a four‐region model of the world economy consisting of the Eurozone‐core, Eurozone‐periphery, United States and Asia. In contrast to most of the existing literature, this model structure enables studying the impact of global current account adjustment on the rebalancing process in the Eurozone. In addition, the model allows for movements of factors of production between tradable and non‐tradable sectors. The results point to the important impact of sectoral reallocation and increases in Asian demand on the size of the internal devaluation as well as on the implied length of the adjustment period.     

The European Union preventive restructuring framework: A hole in one?

While traditionally (Continental) Europe has not been known for an in particular debtor‐ or restructuring‐friendly insolvency practice, in recent decades, important reforms were implemented that would foster restructurings in Europe. In this article, we comparatively look a the status quo of insolvency and restructuring practice in five different European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, UK). We place our observations into the context of the preventive restructuring directive, to be implemented within the next two years after its publication on 26 June 2019. The directive leaves quite some room implementation, from a watered‐down restructuring tool with high access threshold to a pre‐insolvency debtor‐friendly US‐style restructuring procedure.     

Flying under the radar: The effects of short-sale disclosure rules on investor behavior and stock prices

We study how disclosure requirements for large short positions affect investor behavior and security prices. Short positions accumulate just below the applicable disclosure threshold as certain investors never disclose any of their positions. Further tests suggest that this secrecy is part of investors’ general policy of avoiding disclosure to protect their unique, profitable investment strategies against reverse engineering by competitors. No evidence supports the notion that short sellers avoid disclosure because of potential adverse effects on securities' lending fees, risk of recall, or short squeezes. Finally, the evasive behavior by short sellers in response to transparency regulations hampers price discovery.     

Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.     

The systematic risk of corporate bonds: default risk,term risk,and index choice

In this paper, we empirically examine the systematic risk of corporate bonds in the Euro area. Based on a unique sample of 784 bonds from 1999 to 2010, we show that the systematic risk of constructed bond portfolios and individual bonds—measured against three different market indices—depends on credit quality, term risk, and index choice. A significant increase in systematic risk for lower-rated bonds is observed following the start of the financial crisis. In multi-factor models, bond portfolios load significantly on default and term risk, which are included as additional factors. Conducting Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional tests, we find that default and term risk are priced with economically relevant premiums that range from 0.35 to 0.62 % per month. Our results are robust to the inclusion of characteristics such as rating and time to maturity.     

Decline of Controlled Foreign Company Rules and Rise of Intellectual Property Boxes: How the European Court of Justice Affects Tax Competition and Economic Distortions in Europe

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become an influential player in the field of direct taxation in the European Union (EU) in the past 20 years. However, it is unclear whether or not the ECJ's decisions and the corresponding reactions by the member states actually contribute to tax neutrality in economic terms and, therefore, to the achievement of the internal market. In 2006, the ECJ limited the applicability of specific tax rules in the EU that are intended to prohibit the excessive use of low‐tax countries by multinationals. Our counterfactual analysis shows that the court's restriction of so‐called controlled foreign company rules and the related second‐round reactions by some member states – i.e. the introduction of low‐tax regimes for income from acquired intellectual properties (IP boxes for acquired IP) – cast doubt on the seemingly positive effects the ECJ has on reducing tax distortions. In addition, we demonstrate that the restricted applicability of IP boxes as endorsed by the OECD and the European Commission would strengthen tax neutrality in Europe.