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81.
Richard P. O’Neill Emily Bartholomew Fisher Benjamin F. Hobbs Ross Baldick 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2008,34(3):220-250
The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive
power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially
settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for
both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices,
if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission.
The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.
相似文献
82.
Christopher G. Leggett 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2002,23(3):343-355
This paper considers welfare analysis with therandom utility model (RUM) when perceptions ofenvironmental quality differ from objectivemeasures of environmental quality. Environmental quality is assumed to be anexperience good, so that while perceptions ofquality determine choices, ex postutility is determined by objective quality. Given this assumption, I derive a measure ofthe welfare impact of changes in environmentalquality, and I show how this new welfaremeasure differs from the traditional welfaremeasure developed by Hanemann (1982). This newwelfare measure provides an approach tomeasuring the value of information aboutenvironmental quality within the framework ofthe random utility model. 相似文献
83.
Bernhard Hirsch 《Controlling & Management》2007,51(2):88-89
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
84.
85.
Recent research has shown that, although still on a limited scale, the teaching of business ethics in UK higher education has been increasing in recent years. This paper reports on a postal questionnaire survey conducted to investigate the extent to which ethical issues are covered in the teaching of management accounting in higher education. The principal findings are that the majority of management accounting lecturers in the British Isles do not incorporate ethics. About a third of the respondents to the survey do address ethical issues, although about half of those say they do so only implicitly. Various factors underlying the findings and prospects for the future are discussed. 相似文献
86.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
87.
Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk. 相似文献
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