It is not just about paying your dues: Impact of generational cohort on active and passive union participation

The lack of a validated measure of active–passive union participation and a dearth of research into the relationship between generational cohort and union participation challenge union leaders to develop policies and practices to facilitate union renewal. We address these issues by (a) developing a multidimensional measure of union participation that captures both active and passive components, (b) using structural equation modelling to validate the measure within a nomological framework, and (c) investigating the impact of generational cohort on all paths in our framework. Data from members of a large American union confirm that generational cohort influences how union members participate in their union. The two‐factor measure developed in this study facilitates research into antecedents and outcomes of passive and active union participation. Our findings should also prove useful to unions seeking to increase participation within their membership, academics researching unions and generational cohort, and human resource practitioners operating in unionised environments.     

Military coups and the consequences of durable de facto power: the case of Pakistan

We analyze the role of the military as an independent interest group within the State, based on the two-player theoretical framework of Acemoglu and Robinson (Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006); we innovate by introducing the military as a third player, a specialist in violence. In particular, we study the conditions under which a democratic regime can prevent a transition to an authoritarian regime via a military coup, when a coup requires the support of both the military and the elite sections of the civilian population. We carry out an historical case study of Pakistan to motivate and illustrate our argument, and show that Pakistan’s three coups since independence are associated with parameter shifts in our model.     

Entrepreneurship: Cause and Consequence of Financial Optimism

Extant evidence that the self‐employed overestimate their returns by a greater margin than employees is consistent with two mutually inclusive possibilities. Self‐employment may foster optimism or intrinsic optimists may be drawn to self‐employment. Previous research is generally unable to disentangle these effects because of reliance on cross‐sectional data. Using longitudinal data, this paper finds that employees who will be self‐employed in the future overestimate their short‐term financial wellbeing by more than those who never become self‐employed. Optimism is higher still when self‐employed. These results suggest that the greater optimism of the self‐employed reflects both psychological disposition and environmental factors. By providing greater scope for optimism, self‐employment entices the intrinsically optimistic.     

Sample attrition in the RLMS, 2001–10

The data of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) – Higher School of Economics represents one of the few nationally representative sources of household and individual data for Russia. These data have been collected since 1992 and in recent years, thanks to more secure financial and logistical support, have become a resource increasingly drawn upon by scholars and students for national and cross-national studies. In this paper, we examine the extent of non-random attrition in the RLMS and discuss the circumstances under which this might give rise to biases in econometric analysis. We illustrate this with an example drawn from the health sphere.     

Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective

We construct a model in which an investment opportunity arisesfor a first mover before it knows the identity of a second moverand in which joint location results in a negative externality.Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover cannotbargain over its ex ante investment decision with the anonymoussecond mover. Given this departure from the setting of the Coasetheorem, the allocation of property rights over the externalityhas real effects on social welfare. We investigate the relativeefficiency of property rights regimes used in practice: injunctions,damages, the ruling in the Spur Industries case, etc. The firstbest can be obtained by allocating property rights (in particularthe right to sue for damages) to the second mover. Allocatingproperty rights to the first mover, as a "coming to the nuisance"rule entails, leads to overinvestment. In contrast to conventionalwisdom, this inefficiency persists even if a monopoly landownercontrols all the land on which the parties may locate.     

The rank and model specification of demand systems: an empirical analysis using United States microdata

A rank-three demand system is estimated with United States Consumer Expenditure Survey microdata. A unique price data set is also used, which permits the analysis of effects of systematic errors in price variables. It is found that errors in price variables bias test results for the rank-three hypothesis, in particular towards rejection. Other test results are affected to a lesser extent. Estimating smaller systems of demand equations, even when conditioning on excluded goods, yields significantly different results. Another important conclusion is that model specification is statistically significantly different for households of varying family sizes and housing tenure statuses. JEL Classifications: C31, D12.
Le rang et la spécification du modèle des systèmes de demande: une analyse empirique utilisant des microdonnées américaines. On calibre un système de demande de rang trois à l'aide de microdonnées américaines tirées de la United States Consumer Expenditures Survey. Un ensemble unique de prix est utilisé afin de permettre l'analyse des effets d'erreurs systématiques dans les variables de prix. Il appert que les erreurs dans les variables de prix distorsionnent les résultats du test de l'hypothèse de rang trois en faveur d'un rejet. D'autres résultats de tests sont affectés à un moindre degré. Si l'on calibre de plus petits systèmes d'équations de demande, même en posant des conditions sur des biens exclus, des résultats qui diffèrent de manière significative s'ensuivent. Une autre conclusion importante est que la spécification du modèle est différente de manière statistiquement significative pour les ménages selon la taille de la famille et le statut domiciliaire.     

The empire strikes back: Adam Smith,John Stuart Mill,and the Robust Political Economy of empire

Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists. Adam Smith argued that the British Empire was a net cost while John Stuart Mill concluded the same empire was a net benefit. Contemporary arguments about a U.S. Empire map neatly to the divergent views of Smith and Mill. In addition to engaging in an exercise in history of thought, we use Smith’s political economy as a means of adjudicating between the different claims regarding the feasibility of empire. In doing so, we subject the claims of proponents of American Empire against the standard of robust political economy, which holds that intervention must generate desirable outcomes where less than ideal incentive and epistemic conditions hold. In doing so, we conclude that many of the claims made by proponents are fragile under less than ideal conditions.     

Preference-directed regulation when ethical environmental policy choices are formed with limited information

Preference-directed regulation (PDR) can supplement traditional environmental policies through frequent regulatory revision (Livermore, Va Environ Law J 25:311–386, 2007). Using original survey data, PDR is operationalized via counterfactual simulations within a limited information discrete choice model. Augmenting individual opinions about one of the three policies at driving environmental outcomes, stakeholders can induce preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy. The three policies are summarized as: (1) ban; (2) tax; and (3) label. The resulting substitution patterns demonstrate that the extent of preference switching between policies depends on the relative change in individual opinions about a policy. Furthermore, different forms of PDR may be more effective at inducing preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy.