R&D SPILLOVERS TO AGRICULTURE: MEASUREMENT AND APPLICATION

This paper documents research and development (R7amp;D) spillovers between nations and between industries, discussing some theoretical and measurement issues. A new technique makes patent data more practical for economic uses, allowing analysis of the industries of manufacture and sectors of use for inventions. New technology introduced for use in the agricultural and food processing sectors in 14 less developed and newly industrialized nations is traced, comparing the regional and industrial sources of these inventions across time. An application shows that both international and interindustrial spillovers add to agricultural total factor productivity, and distinguishes between the direct and indirect effects of spillovers from public and private, domestic and foreign sources. ( JEL C67, 031, 047, Q16)     

Okun's Law: Fit at 50?

This paper asks how well Okun's Law fits short‐run unemployment movements in the United States since 1948 and in 20 advanced economies since 1980. We find that Okun's Law is a strong relationship in most countries, and one that is fairly stable over time. Accounts of breakdowns in the Law, such as the emergence of “jobless recoveries,” are flawed or exaggerated. We also find that the coefficient in the relationship—the effect of a 1% change in output on the unemployment rate—varies substantially across countries. This variation is partly explained by idiosyncratic features of national labor markets, but it is not related to differences in employment protection legislation.     

CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PROPERTY CLAIMS IN A DYNAMIC WORLD

Constitutional political economy concerns the legal foundations of the market. One central component of that legal infrastructure relates to property rights over objects and circumstances. The idea of "takings" causes one to focus on the conditions under which regulatory actions call for compensation to those who imagine that their property rights have been taken. A dynamic economy is alleged here to be one in which legal processes must carry the burden of discovering when particular parties have an interest that can be said to constitute a property right requiring compensation. That is, objects and circumstances are not protected because they are "property." Rather, those objects and circumstances that are protected become, by virtue of that protection, "property." The task for the economist is to understand the perverse incentives to flow from a compensation requirement on all instances of institutional change concerning landed property. A further task is to incorporate a dynamic concept of property rights into general equilibrium models of economic systems.     

LEGAL CORRUPTION

We challenge the conventional definition of corruption through the analysis of legal forms of corruption, and by devoting special attention to influence induced by the private sector. This paper studies the determinants of the world pattern of legal and illegal corruption by proposing a simple theoretical model of endogenous corruption and related legal framework, and its thorough empirical test. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified: one based on illegal corruption, where the elite does not face any binding incentives to limit corruption; one centered around legal corruption, where the elite must incur a cost to legally protect corruption; and finally a no‐corruption outcome, where the population is able to effectively react to corruption. Testable implications from the model are derived based on country‐wide parameters. Crucially, we use a rich corporate survey, including 8,279 firms in 104 countries, tailored for this research, and featuring measures of legal corruption that are novel to the literature. The microdimension of the database enables improving on familiar shortcomings associated with the use of endogeneity‐prone, country‐wide indices of perceived corruption. The empirical results, making use of a broad range of proxies and sources, generally validate the model's explanations.     

Learning to Wait: A Laboratory Investigation

Human subjects decide when to sink a fixed cost C to seize an irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by Brownian motion. The optimal policy is to invest when V first crosses a threshold V * = (1 + w *) C , where the wait option premium w * depends on drift, volatility, and expiration hazard parameters. Subjects in the Low w * treatment on average invest at values quite close to optimum. Subjects in the two Medium and the High w * treatments invested at values below optimum, but with the predicted ordering, and values approached the optimum by the last block of 20 periods.     

CASELOAD IMPACTS OF WELFARE REFORM

A welfare reform demonstration program designed to reduce Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recidivism through increased employment and training services resulted in significantly higher short-term caseload growth. Demonstration sites attracted proportionally more households onto assistance early in the demonstration than did comparison sites. These entrants tended to have more extensive previous employment histories. This result suggests that the demonstration attracted individuals who previously qualified for AFDC but did not apply for benefits and/or individuals who reduced their employment to qualify for AFDC. Exits from AFDC also were delayed under the demonstration, suggesting that the more intensive services provided through the demonstration required more time to complete. Finally, certain groups—nonwhites and those with language problems, for example—apparently avoided the demonstration by not migrating into demonstration sites or by migrating out of demonstration sites. These results have important implications for the likely costs of state welfare reform efforts under the Family Support Act of 1988 .     

INCREASED INDUSTRIAL USES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES POLICY, TRADE AND ETHANOL

Using agricultural feedstocks for industrial products affects domestic and international agricultural markets, all of which are encumbered with complex policies. This article examines the interaction of three seemingly unrelated policies: the Clean Air Act, the U.S. corn program, and European Union agricultural subsidies. More ethanol production, resulting from new regulations associated with the Clean Air Act, increases the use of U.S. corn and increases the supply of corn gluten feed, an ethanol co-product. Corn gluten feed is primarily exported to Europe under a loophole in European Union trade barriers. But recent reform of European Union farm policy will lower the price of the European grain for which corn gluten feed is a substitute. This development lowers prices for a major ethanol co-product and thus makes ethanol itself less profitable just as the demand for the fuel is expanding. NAFTA, GATT, and new technologies also play cameo roles in the story .