SNAKE RIVER SALMON RECOVERY: QUANTIFYING THE COSTS

Economic costs are relevant to endangered species protection in both theory and practice. Recovering endangered Snake River salmon will require modifying public land use, restricting fishing and hatchery production, reducing water for agriculture, and altering the operation of hydroelectric dams. The economic costs are estimated to range from $246 million to $359 million per year. While the estimated cost is not matched by the estimated increased value of fishing, the nonuse value of salmon recovery may be very large. Better economic and biological information is needed to assure that decisions for salmon species protection are reasonably cost effective. ( JEL Q28, H43)     

Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

Human Work in Catholic Social Thought

In Catholic Social Thought, work is at the center of issues related to morality and economic life. It is simultaneously objective and subjective. Workers are the real agents of production, and therefore labor should have priority over capital. The able‐bodied have a moral obligation to work to obtain the things they need, but everyone has a claim on the basic necessities of life. Hence the property claims of the well‐to‐do are not to exclude the poor from what they need. The property‐right claim of stockholders depends on the firm serving work and the interests of workers. In unions, workers' natural right to form associations aligns with the right to participate in decisions affecting their lives. Numerous groups and organizations have some degree of complicity in workplace injustice and some degree of responsibility to address it.     

The Real Effects of Government‐Owned Banks: Evidence from an Emerging Market

Using plant‐level data for Brazilian manufacturing firms, this paper provides evidence that government control over banks leads to significant political influence over the real decisions of firms. I find that firms eligible for government bank lending expand employment in politically attractive regions near elections. These expansions are associated with additional (favorable) borrowing from government banks. Further, these persistent expansions take place just before competitive elections, and are associated with lower future employment growth by firms in other regions. The analysis suggests that politicians in Brazil use bank lending to shift employment towards politically attractive regions and away from unattractive regions.     

Can Markets Discipline Government Agencies? Evidence from the Weather Derivatives Market

We analyze the role of financial markets in shaping the incentives of government agencies using a unique empirical setting: the weather derivatives market. We show that the introduction of weather derivative contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) improves the accuracy of temperature measurement by 13% to 20% at the underlying weather stations. We argue that temperature‐based financial markets generate additional scrutiny of the temperature data measured by the National Weather Service, which motivates the agency to minimize measurement errors. Our results have broader implications: the visibility and scrutiny generated by financial markets can potentially improve the efficiency of government agencies.     

Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events

Using variation in firms’ exposure to their CEOs resulting from hospitalization, we estimate the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm policies, holding firm-CEO matches constant. We document three main findings. First, CEOs have a significant effect on profitability and investment. Second, CEO effects are larger for younger CEOs, in growing and family-controlled firms, and in human-capital-intensive industries. Third, CEOs are unique: the hospitalization of other senior executives does not have similar effects on the performance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that CEOs are a key driver of firm performance, which suggests that CEO contingency plans are valuable.     

Evidence on the Characteristics of Cross Sectional Variation in Stock Returns

Firm sizes and book-to-market ratios are both highly correlated with the average returns of common stocks. Fama and French (1993) argue that the association between these characteristics and returns arise because the characteristics are proxies for nondiversifiable factor risk. In contrast, the evidence in this article indicates that the return premia on small capitalization and high book-to-market stocks does not arise because of the comovements of these stocks with pervasive factors. It is the characteristics rather than the covariance structure of returns that appear to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns.     

How Do Financing Constraints Affect Firms’ Equity Volatility?

Theory suggests that financing frictions can have significant implications for equity volatility by shaping firms’ exposure to economic risks. This paper provides evidence that an important determinant of higher equity volatility among research and development (R&D)‐intensive firms is fewer financing constraints on firms’ ability to access growth options. I provide evidence for this effect by studying how persistent shocks to the value of firms’ tangible assets (real estate) affect their subsequent equity volatility. The analysis addresses concerns about the identification of these balance sheet effects and shows that these effects are consistent with broader patterns on the equity volatility of R&D‐intensive firms.