Market Statistics and Technical Analysis: The Role of Volume

We investigate the informational role of volume and its applicability for technical analysis. We develop a new equilibrium model in which aggregate supply is fixed and traders receive signals with differing quality. We show that volume provides information on information quality that cannot be deduced from the price statistic. We show how volume, information precision, and price movements relate, and demonstrate how sequences of volume and prices can be informative. We also show that traders who use information contained in market statistics do better than traders who do not. Technical analysis thus arises as a natural component of the agents' learning process.     

Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Customer Markets

We present a model in which some goods trade in “customer markets” and advertising facilitates long‐lived relationships. We estimate the model on U.S. data and find a large congestion externality in the pricing of customer market goods. This motivates the analysis of optimal policy. Under a complete set of taxes, fiscal policy eliminates the externalities with large adjustments in tax rates on customer markets goods, while labor tax volatility remains low. Constraining the instruments to the interest rate and labor tax, the optimal labor tax displays large and procyclical fluctuations, but monetary policy is little changed compared to a model with no customer markets.     

Training, Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on Treatment Effects

This paper empirically assesses the wage effects of the Job Corps program, one of the largest federally funded job training programs in the U.S. Even with the aid of a randomized experiment, the impact of a training program on wages is difficult to study because of sample selection, a pervasive problem in applied microeconometric research. Wage rates are only observed for those who are employed, and employment status itself may be affected by the training program. This paper develops an intuitive trimming procedure for bounding average treatment effects in the presence of sample selection. In contrast to existing methods, the procedure requires neither exclusion restrictions nor a bounded support for the outcome of interest. Identification results, estimators, and their asymptotic distribution are presented. The bounds suggest that the program raised wages, consistent with the notion that the Job Corps raises earnings by increasing human capital, rather than solely through encouraging work. The estimator is generally applicable to typical treatment evaluation problems in which there is nonrandom sample selection/attrition.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Incorporation and Resistance: Analytical Issues in the Conventionalization Debate and Alternative Food Chains

This article examines arguments about the relationship between mainstream agriculture and alternative food chains. It begins with a summary of Guthman's study of organic agriculture in California and her conclusion that it has come to resemble conventional, industrial agriculture in its agrarian structures and its supply chains. The article raises questions about both the evidence that smaller alternative producers have been squeezed out, and the assumptions underlying the analysis of relations between capitalist and non-capitalist forms. The issues are contextualized through a summary of earlier debates about the fate of non-capitalist producers in the 'development' process, and through reference to studies in economic anthropology, including research on household farming strategies in Italy. The article concludes that alternative food chains do not follow a simple linear trajectory, and that we need to include an ethnographic approach to understand both their economic values and political objectives.     

建设狂潮背后的危险游戏

中国的固定资产投资已古全国国内生产总值的将近70%——进入现代之后,其他任何大国都不曾有过这么高的比例。即使是在20世纪80年代的日本建设高潮时期,这一投资比例也只占到其国内生产总值的35%左右。