The Endurance and Eclipse of the Controlled Vote: A Formal Model of Vote Brokerage Under the Secret Ballot

Throughout much of mankind's experience with elections, vote brokers – local elites who direct the voting decisions of a subset of the electorate – have been able to make or break political careers. In various polities, brokers have thrived in spite of the secret ballot, a surprising outcome given that vote secrecy would ostensibly allow citizens to pocket the inducements offered by such individuals and vote their consciences anyway. To address this puzzle, we develop a framework for understanding the persistence and demise of vote brokerage under the secret ballot. In our model, a broker contracts with voters using an outcome contingent contract: some fixed benefit is promised to all voters sharing one of several observable profiles should the broker's candidate win the election. Using this framework, we demonstrate that the existence of brokerage depends on the size of the electorate contained within the jurisdiction controlled by the broker, with large jurisdiction sizes tending to drive brokerage out of existence. Moreover, we detail the manner in which the strategies employed by brokers depend on their economic power, the size of social groups, and ideological polarization. Empirical evidence from Minas Gerais, Brazil is used to evaluate the performance of the model.     

Absenteeism and Undergraduate Exam Performance

The author investigates the relationship between students' absenteeism during a principles of microeconomics course and their subsequent performance on exams. Records were maintained regarding the specific class periods that each student missed during the semester. Records were also kept of the class meeting when the material corresponding to each multiple-choice test question was covered. A qualitative choice model reveals that students who missed class on a given date were significantly more likely to respond incorrectly to questions relating to material covered that day than students who were present.     

Growth,convergence and public investment. A Bayesian model averaging approach

The aim of this study is twofold. First, the determinants of economic growth are studied among a wide set of potential variables for the Spanish provinces (NUTS3). Among others, various types of private, public and human capital in the group of growth factors are included. Also, it is analysed whether Spanish provinces have converged in economic terms in recent decades. The second objective is to obtain cross-section and panel data parameter estimates that are robust to model specification. For this purpose, a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach is used. Bayesian methodology constructs parameter estimates as a weighted average of linear regression estimates for every possible combination of included variables. The weight of each regression estimate is given by the posterior probability of each model.     

A Survey of Textbooks for Industrial Organization and Public Policy

All teachers of economics will be interested in the author's dissection of the industrial organization course into its components. Teachers of this specialty will find this survey particularly useful for its examination of how the major texts treat each of the components.     

Searching for the sunk cost fallacy

We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . Jel Classification C91, D11     

Can intertemporal choice experiments elicit time preferences for consumption?

The paper considers what can be inferred about experimental subjects’ time preferences for consumption from responses to laboratory tasks involving tradeoffs between sums of money at different dates, if subjects can reschedule consumption spending relative to income in external capital markets. It distinguishes three approaches identifiable in the literature: the straightforward view; the separation view; and the censored data view. It shows that none of these is fully satisfactory and discusses the resulting implications for intertemporal decision-making experiments. JEL Classification C90, C91, D90, D91, D11, D12     

Electoral uncertainty and financial volatility: Evidence from two‐round presidential races in emerging markets

We study how the predictability and the decisiveness of electoral outcomes affect financial volatility. We argue that traders’ optimal investment strategies depend on their ability to make accurate electoral forecasts and the prospective losses associated with placing a bet on the wrong candidate. Using a triple difference‐in‐difference approach and data from two‐round presidential elections in five Latin American countries between 1999 and 2018, we find that financial volatility is greatest in the days immediately following unpredictable, decisive, elections. Postelectoral volatility also occurs following predictable, indecisive elections. The effect of learning the identity of the winning candidate on financial volatility is null when the election is unpredictable and indecisive, as well as when the election is decisive, but the outcome is predictable. These findings offer insights into investors seeking to hedge price risk around elections. They also have important implications regarding the relationship between public opinion polls and postelectoral financial volatility.     

Bargaining with asymmetric information in non-stationary markets

Summary. The Rubinstein and Wolinsky bargaining-in-markets framework is modified by the introduction of asymmetric information and non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is introduced in the form of an arbitrary stochastic Markov process which captures the dynamics of market entry and pairwise matching. A new technique is used for establishing existence and characterizing the unique outcome of a non-stationary market equilibrium. The impact of market supply and demand on bilateral bargaining outcomes and matching probabilities is explored. The results are useful for examining such questions as why coordination failures and macroeconomic output fluctuations are correlated with real and monetary shocks. Received: July 22, 1994; revised version: January 21, 1998