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121.
Extant empirical research has reported nonlinear behavior within arbitrage relationships. In this article, the authors consider potential nonlinear dynamics within FTSE‐100 index and index‐futures. Such nonlinearity can be rationalized by the existence of transactions costs or through the interaction between informed and noise traders. They consider several empirical models designed to capture these alternative dynamics. Their empirical results provide evidence of a stationary basis term, and thus cointegration between index and index‐futures, and the presence of nonlinear dynamics within that relationship. The results further suggest that noise traders typically engage in momentum trading and are more prone to this behavior type when the underlying market is rising. Fundamental, or arbitrage, traders are characterized by heterogeneity, such that there is slow movement between regimes of behavior. In particular, fundamental traders act more quickly in response to small deviations from equilibrium, but are reluctant to act quickly in response to larger mispricings that are exposed to greater noise trader price risk. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:343–368, 2006 相似文献
122.
We document producer price adjustment using a low‐inflation micro price dataset. On average 24% of prices adjust each month, with an average increase/decrease of 6%. Producer prices adjust more frequently than consumer prices, but their size of adjustment is typically smaller. Sectoral heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment is strongly related to heterogeneity in the cost structure. Fluctuations in aggregate producer price inflation occur to a large extent through variation in the relative share of upward and downward price adjustment. 相似文献
123.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
124.
David Cui Andy Zhao Tracy Tian 《海外经济评论》2008,(15):30-32
外资企业离开世界工厂
据报道,2007年有224家外资企业离开了珠三角,另有29840家港资企业(占大约80000家港资企业的37.3%)也有同样的计划。另一方面,自2007年初至今,已有103家韩资企业离开了北方制造业中心山东。 相似文献
125.
Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk. 相似文献
126.
Antoine Bouët Yvan Decreux Lionel Fontagné Sébastien Jean David Laborde 《Review of International Economics》2008,16(5):850-863
This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution. 相似文献
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130.
David Sunding 《Review of Economic Design》1994,1(1):355-363
In a seminal paper on electoral equilibrium under majority rule, Ledyard (1984) demonstrates that strategic participation
by voters results in an electoral equilibrium at the proposal that maximizes the utility of a randomly selected voter. Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1985) limit the usefulness of this result by showing that strategic participation rates are miniscule in large
electorates, and that the incentive to participate vanishes completely as the electorate grows without bound. The most reasonable
modification of Ledyard’s approach that circumvents these criticisms is to allow for a negative cost of voting. We show that
when voters can have even an arbitrarily small negative cost of voting, there is an electorate sufficiently large so that
any proposal is defeated or tied by the median proposal. This observation raises questions about the existence of electoral
equilibrium under strategic participation, and is relevant to the efficiency of elections. 相似文献