Obtaining global market access for GMPCS

Demand for wireless telephony is huge and the potential for GMPCS, in particular, is widely recognized. However, the most serious problems to the introduction of GMPCS are not technical, nor financial, but are rather the political and regulatory barriers—notably fear of bypass and security concerns. Inmarsat does not believe that there should be any a priori limit to the number of GMPCS operators offering satellite capacity to national service providers. The market can best determine which will be successful. However, before countries open their markets, they will need to be convinced that it is in their interest to do so.     

Estimating the Effect of Air Quality: Spatial versus Traditional Hedonic Price Models

Empirical studies of hedonic housing prices show that the spatial maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method is preferable to the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) hedonic method. Current computing capabilities restrict the MLE method to relatively small data sets. This paper circumvents this limitation by coupling the spatial MLE method with block bootstrapping, a form of Monte Carlo simulation that accounts for spatially dependent data. Blocks are created based on monthly and census tract information for resampling. For each month, we obtained 50 resamples of 750 observations from a data set of 15,727 residential properties to compare OLS and MLE empirical results. We find that the spatial MLE method consistently outperforms the traditional OLS method under these simulated conditions and that air quality matters irrespective of the method used.     

Right-sided endocarditis

Right-sided endocarditis is uncommon and usually involves the tricuspid valve. It occurs primarily in intravenous drug uses, and patients having pacemakers, central lines, or congenital heart disease.     

A conceptual development of Simons’ Levers of Control framework

The management control literature has been criticised for having concepts that are ill-defined. This causes mixed empirical results and makes it difficult to build a coherent body of knowledge. The paper addresses this issue by developing an important framework, that of Simons’ Levers of Control, which has been criticised in the past for its vague and ambiguous definitions. Using methods of concept analysis, the paper analyses prior literature to identify ambiguities with the different levers of control and uses examples from prior field studies to illustrate these ambiguities. The paper also analyses the positive and negative dimensions of controls, which, although part of Simons’ framework, have remained unexplored. For each ambiguity identified, the paper proposes a solution to improve concept definitions or to clarify the relationship between concepts. The result is a revised framework that explicitly separates managerial intentions for controls and employee perceptions of controls. Managerial intentions are comprised of three levels: 1) types of controls (social and technical) 2) which are organised as four control systems (strategic performance, operational performance, strategic boundaries and operational boundaries) and 3) which can be used diagnostically or interactively, have an enabling or constraining role and can lead to either reward or punishment. Finally, after defining the framework's concepts and explaining how they interact, the paper concludes by offering avenues for future research.     

Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.