Politically stable pay-as-you-go pension systems: When the social-insurance budget is too small in a democracy

The essay analyzes in an overlapping-generations model, to which extent a pay-as-you-go pension system will be the outcome of majority voting, given specific institutional set-ups. Clearly, the vote of an active person depends on his expectations about how the present decision (i.e., his contribution) is linked to the future (i.e., his benefits), when he will be retired. In the paper we employ the assumption of a basic social contract where each active voter's future benefits are positively related to his contributions. It is shown that in this framework a steady-state with a positive (though lower than optimal) level of the pension system exists, even if a new majority decision about the system takes place every period.     

CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKET: AN EXAMINATION OF NHS FOUNDATION TRUST CLASSIFICATION IN THE UK

ABSTRACT: In this paper we argue that national accounting categories provide an inadequate basis for evaluating differences between public and private sector services. This is because accounting categories rely on economic concepts such as market price but do not take account of substantive public policy goals such as universality. The argument has important consequences for the structures and systems of delivery especially where nonprofit providers and social enterprise models are substituted for public bodies formerly integrated into the government's delivery system. Using an example taken from the UK's National Health Service, we show that the mechanisms for ensuring universality through redistribution are not sufficiently taken into account for classification purposes.     

Racing in two dimensions

In this paper we study an industry in which there is an ongoing sequence of R&D races between two firms. Firms are engaged in product innovation. Products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. There are two key characteristics/dimensions to products, and the level at which these are embodied in products can be increased by R&D. At each time firms can spend R&D on improving their product in one or both dimensions. We allow the possibility of economies scope — so R&D undertaken in one dimension can spillover to the other. The question we are interested in is whether a firm that is ahead in a single dimension but behind in another will focus all its R&D effort in the area in which it is ahead (product specialisation), or whether it will try to do R&D in both dimensions in the hope that it might get ahead in both and end up with a superproduct that dominates in both characteristics. The outcome of this R&D competition determines a Markov transition probability matrix determining the evolution of the industry. We show that when the R&D technology is characterized by constant returns then the only steady-state outcome is one in which the economy stays forever in a position in which one firm produces a super-product and the other gives up doing R&D altogether. This outcome is unaffected by the degree of economies of scope. When the R&D technology is characterised by decreasing returns, then the industry will visit all states and so will exhibit both product specialisation and superproduct dominance at various times. Now the extent of economies of scope matters and we show that the greater the extent of economies of scope, the less likely is the industry to exhibit product dominance, and the more likely it is to exhibit product specialisation.     

The supply of consumption goods in centrally planned economies

Estimates are given, based on annual time series from the mid-1950s to 1975, of planner's supply functions for consumption goods in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and Poland. The supply function is specified in the form of a behavioral rule describing the planners' short-run adjustment of consumption away from its long-run trend. The fits are good, and the estimates support the a priori specification and the maintained hypothesis of stable resource-allocation behavior. These supply functions, together with household demand functions estimated in a separate paper, will provide a starting point for disequilibrium estimation of the consumption-goods market for these economies.     

CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES: A DISSENTING VOICE

(The text which follows formed the basis for a brief presentation to a conference held on 22 April 2009 at the Said Business School, Oxford University. The subject of the conference was 'Beyond Kyoto – Green Innovation and Enterprise in the 21st Century'.)
Governments across the world are mishandling climate change issues. The content, the orientation, and in particular the basis and rationale of current policies to curb emissions of (so-called) 'greenhouse gases', are all open to serious question.     

MISGUIDED CORPORATE VIRTUE: THE CASE AGAINST CSR,AND THE TRUE ROLE OF BUSINESS TODAY1

The doctrine of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has now been accepted across the world – not only by businesses and business organisations, together with an array of commentators and NGOs, but also by many governments. This is a worrying development. The doctrine rests on mistaken presumptions about recent economic developments and their implications for the role and conduct of enterprises, while putting it into effect would make the world poorer and more over‐regulated.     

A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments*

The difference and system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators are growing in popularity. As implemented in popular software, the estimators easily generate instruments that are numerous and, in system GMM, potentially suspect. A large instrument collection overfits endogenous variables even as it weakens the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. This paper reviews the evidence on the effects of instrument proliferation, and describes and simulates simple ways to control it. It illustrates the dangers by replicating Forbes [American Economic Review (2000) Vol. 90, pp. 869–887] on income inequality and Levine et al. [Journal of Monetary Economics] (2000) Vol. 46, pp. 31–77] on financial sector development. Results in both papers appear driven by previously undetected endogeneity.