Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers

The personal computer (PC) marketplace in the US presents a dizzying array of component suppliers and products. No single firm dominates the industry with a complete package of hardware and software components. Although one company's operating systems and general-purpose applications are installed on most PCs in the US, the other system components—processors, memory, storage devices, display adapters, monitors, specialized applications, and so on—come from any number of sources. David T. Methe, Ryoko Toyama, and Junichiro Miyabe point out that the PC industry in Japan also exhibits this decentralized nature. However, they also note that despite the decentralized network structure of the Japanese PC industry, one company—NEC—was able to achieve a dominant market share. To provide insight into the key issues involved in the management of complex technology, they contrast NEC's strategic approach to product development and organizational learning with the approaches taken by Fujitsu—the firm that placed a distant second in this market. Despite matching NEC in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and managerial talent, Fujitsu never managed to threaten NEC's dominance of the PC market in Japan. Fujitsu continually emphasized technological leadership, even at the expense of protecting its installed base. Poor coordination of resources and product development efforts resulted in incompatibilities among Fujitsu's various products, and the company failed to foster close relationships with suppliers of such key technologies as software and peripherals. NEC's PCs did not enjoy the advantages of first-to-market status or technological leadership. Instead, NEC achieved market dominance by finding the combination of product technologies that met the needs of the greatest number of consumers. Throughout almost 20 years of competition in the PC industry, NEC successfully maintained consistency and backward compatibility across its product lines. NEC also recognized the importance of third-party software developers, and carefully cultivated relations with these firms as a source of competitive advantage. In other words, NEC struck the right balance between three key factors: technological innovation, motivation of third-party developers of software and peripherals, and service to its installed base of customers.     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.     

THE RETURNS TO ENDOGENOUS HUMAN CAPITAL IN PAKISTAN'S RURAL WAGE LABOUR MARKET

This paper estimates the private returns to human capital in Pakistani rural labour markets. The rich data used permit inclusion of several dimensions of human capital and control for endogeneity resulting from investment in human capital. The results suggest that, without data on determinants of human capital, it would not be possible to disentangle the separate effect of each dimension of human capital on wage differentials nor to distinguish human capital explanations for wage differentials from signalling and credentialist models. With control for endogeneity of human capital and selectivity into wage employment, cognitive achievement, but not schooling attainment separate from cognitive achievement nor long-run health status, affects wage differentials.     

Futures and forward price differential and the effect of marking‐to‐market: Australian evidence

The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of marking‐to‐market of futures contracts on the price differential between futures and forward contracts based on the predictions of the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) (CIR) model. Cox et al ., (1981) derive a series of propositions with respect to the relationship between futures and forward prices and a set of testable implications. These are tested empirically in this paper using Australian data from November 1991 to June 1997. The results provide evidence of the presence of significant futures and forward price differences, where the futures price is consistently below the forward price. Only partial support is found for the Cox et al ., (1981) propositions, implying that the effect of marking‐to‐market is not able to fully account for the price differential. Therefore, it is not possible to rule out the influence of other institutional factors on the futures‐forward price difference.     

The excess burden of the tax and social premium system for Dutch married women

Summary The excess burden of a tax is the diminution of utility above that which would have occurred had the tax been collected as a lump sum. Computing the excess burden for the 1983 and 1985 Dutch tax and social premium system enables a partial welfare evaluation of the recent changes in the system, the so-called Tweeverdienersmaatregelen. Based on the equivalent and compensating variation, the excess burden as a percentage of the taxes and social premiums for the 1983 and 1985 system are valued at 27010 and 84010, and 37010 and 58010 respectively. This result indicates that, welfare-theoretically, the old system seems preferable to the new one.The author wishes to thank Hans Doodeman, Paul Renaud and Jacques Siegers for their critical remarks on an earlier version of this article.     

Cost and technical change: Effects from bank deregulation

Banks were substantially deregulated during the 1980s. This altered the cost-minimizing mix between deposit interest payments and operating expenses (capital and labor for branch convenience and free deposit services). Measured bank output was relatively unaffected by these changes. The proportion of deposits receiving higher interest rates increased more rapidly than factor quantities were reduced, so unit deposit costs rose. Consumers benefited, but the measured net effects for banks were negative, averaging –0.8% to –1.4% a year in net technical change from 1977 to 1988. These influences were measured three different ways and for both equilibrium and disequilibrium factor input specifications. All three approaches—a standard time trend, a time-specific index, and shifts in cross-sectional cost functions—gave consistent results. The results were robust whether measured at the banking firm or branch office level or on the cost frontier.