Seasonal Migration and Networks—Evidence on Moldova’s Labour Exodus

Seasonal migration is an ever more important phenomenon worldwide, but has received little attention in empirical research. This paper investigates the choice of seasonal versus longer-term migration on a household level. We use data from Moldova, a country that is witnessing a massive emigration shock. Surprisingly, neither children nor marital status appear to influence the decision to leave seasonally or for longer periods. This suggests high social and emotional costs of emigration. We also find that existing local networks of seasonal migrants are unrelated to permanent migration choice. Generally, networks appear to have a stronger influence on migration probabilities in urban settings. JEL no. F22, J61, O15     

THE RISE IN MANAGERIAL STOCK OWNERSHIP

Despite the widespread view from Berle and Means onward that ownership of U.S. companies has become increasingly separated from managerial control, the authors report that managerial ownership of public corporations is markedly higher today than in 1935. Using a comprehensive sample of the 1,500 publicly traded firms in 1935 and a comparable sample of 4,200 firms in 1995, their study finds that managerial ownership increased from an average of 13% in 1935 to 21% in 1995. In terms of real (1995) dollar values, average managerial ownership increased from $18 million to $73 million over the same 60‐year period. One potential explanation for this increase is that greater reliance on managerial ownership has substituted for less reliance on other incentive alignment devices, such as pay‐for performance and the market for corporate control. The authors, however, report just the opposite. The use of such other corporate governance mechanisms has generally also increased over time, suggesting that the top managements of today's publicly traded corporations face greater pressure from investors and boards of directors than managements earlier in the century. An alternative explanation concern possible changes over time in the effects of certain company characteristics on the costs and benefits of using managerial ownership as a control device. While most of the characteristics the authors examined had the same relationship to managerial ownership in both periods, the role of volatility was different. In 1935, managerial ownership was inversely related to firm volatility; that is, higher volatility was associated with lower managerial ownership. In 1995, however, the relationship of managerial ownership to volatility was “nonlinear”; managerial ownership was positively related to firm volatility at low and moderate levels of volatility but the relationship turns negative when firm volatility is high. The overall lower level of volatility today, together with advances in capital markets and financial theory that have reduced the costs of hedging, appear to have reduced the costs of managers holding large stakes in their firms.     

Analyzing the commitment-loyalty link in service contexts

This study addressed the ill-understood issue of how loyalty develops in service patrons. Although many theorists hold commitment to be an essential part of this process, the link between commitment and loyalty has received little empirical attention. To address this void, the study first portrayed commitment’s root tendency to resist changing preference as a function of three antecedent processes. Second, this portrayal formed the basis for developing a psychometrically sound scale to measure the construct of commitment. Third, the scale was then used in a mediating effects model (M-E-M) to test the commitment-loyalty link. Path analyses found this parsimonious structure to be a significant improvement over rival direct effects models (D-E-Ms). Results found the tendency to resist changing preference to be a key precursor to loyalty, largely explained by a patron’s willingness to identify with a brand. Implications of these findings for loyalty’s development and research are explored. Mark P. Pritchard is an assistant professor with the Recreation Management and Tourism Department at Arizona State University and has published inLeisure Sciences, theJournal of Travel Research, and theJournal of Travel and Tourism Marketing. His research concentrates on the application of consumer behavior theory in the travel industry, with a specific focus on commitment and loyalty. Mark E. Havitz is a professor of recreation and leisure studies at the University of Waterloo. He regularly publishes in theJournal of Leisure Research, Leisure Sciences, and theAnnals of Tourism Research, and he has written for theJournal of Consumer Psychology. His primary research interests relate to leisure involvement, commitment, and loyalty. Dennis R. Howard is a professor of marketing in the Charles H. Lundquist College of Business at the University of Oregon. He also serves as the academic coordinator of the college’s James Warsaw Sports Marketing Center. His research focuses on sports marketing with a particular interest on understanding factors that motivate and sustain consumer interest in sport.     

An economic model of waterlogging and salinization in arid regions

Waterlogging and salinization arise in arid areas largely because two essential resources, irrigation water and the assimilative capacity of unconfined aquifers, are not priced or allocated correctly to reflect scarcity values and opportunity costs. Farm-level and project-level models of crop production are examined to identify policies that will encourage farmers to consider opportunity costs and the effects of irrigation and leaching on depth to regional water tables. Appropriate policies include volumetric water pricing, water markets, tradable water allotments, adjustments in area-based cost recovery programs, and incentives for farmers to use irrigation methods that reduce deep percolation. Implementing appropriate versions of these policies may reduce the rate of increase in waterlogged and saline areas.     

The Incentive to Discriminate by a Vertically-Integrated Regulated Firm: A Reply

In Weisman (1995), I construct a model to investigate the incentives of a vertically-integrated regulated firm to discriminate against downstream rivals. This model suggests that the RBOCs do not have the same incentives to discriminate as AT&T prior to divestiture. Reiffen (1998) questions this and other conclusions. This reply addresses his claims.