Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices: how best to signal quality?

We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lower, it will be optimal to set a low first-period price, not to serve all would-be consumers at this price (selective distribution) and raise the price afterwards. Paradoxically, this strategy allows a larger customer base to be reached than in the case of pure price signalling.     

Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model

We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and one or two firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. The question in this paper is whether a decentralized choice through majority vote would lead to more or less competition. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the viewpoint of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, under concentrated ownership (where owners have a null density), duopoly is always preferred by the majority; while under egalitarian ownership (where firms are equally shared by all the population), the choice of the majority depends on the relative size of workers' and consumers' segments.     

Storage losses,liquidity constraints,and maize storage decisions in Benin

This article estimates how storage losses from mold, insects, and other pests, combined with liquidity constraints, influence a smallholder farm household's decision to store maize on farm after harvest. We analyze panel data from 309 smallholders in Benin covering the 2011 and 2013 harvest seasons. Results suggest that smallholders are driven to sell at harvest time for different reasons, depending on their motivation for storing. In households that report direct consumption as their primary goal for storing maize, liquidity constraints, not storage losses, reduce the amount they store. In contrast, households that store maize with the intention of selling it later in the year appear unaffected by liquidity constraints. Instead, these households store less when they expect to lose more during storage. These results suggest that policies to provide liquidity will be more helpful in motivating storage among consumption‐oriented households. Households motivated to store for later sale will benefit from modern storage technologies that mitigate the operational costs associated with storage losses.     

Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information

In this paper, I analyze optimal royalty contracts in forestry when the harvesting firm has private information on the cost of harvesting. This infinite horizon forest rotation model with asymmetry of information on the cost parameter results in a dynamic incentive problem. Depending on whether the costs are correlated over time or not, the firm either receives rent or receives no rent, associated with the continuation part of the rotation choice. I characterize the optimal contract explicitly in both cases. I also examine the loss in expected welfare surplus resulting from the use of a linear contract instead of the more general non‐linear contract.     

Sur l'intervention de l'état dans le financement du logement

Magri, S. 1972: Politique du logement et besoins en main d'?uvre. Pinçon, M. 1976: Les HLM. Structure sociale de la population logée, agglomération de Paris. Harvey, D. 1973: Social justice and the city Roberts, J. T. 1976: General improvement areas. Farnborough: National Community Development Project 1975: The poverty of the improvement programme. Lindberg, L. N., Alford, R., Crouch, C. and Offe, C. , editors, 1975: Stress and contradiction in modern capitalism. Perlman, J. E. 1976: The myth of marginality: urban poverty and politics in Rio de Janeiro. Granelle, J-J. 1975: La valeur du sol urbain et la propriété foncière: le marché des terrains à Paris.     

The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies

We analyze a two country-two good model of international trade in which citizens in each country differ by their specific factor endowments. The trade policy in each country is set by the politician who has been elected by the citizens in a previous stage. Due to a delegation effect citizens generally favor candidates who are more protectionist than they are. The one-candidate-per-country equilibria exhibit a “protectionist drift” owing to this delegation effect. In addition, we find an additional source of protectionist drift that we call the “abstention effect”. Not only do candidates wish to delegate to more protectionist colleagues, but these more protectionist colleagues who can win election, prefer still more protectionist candidates than themselves. Therefore, they have an incentive to abstain, that is, not run for election. We show that because of this abstention effect there exists a range of electable citizens all of whom are more protectionist than the median voter's most preferred candidate. We extend the analysis allowing two-candidate equilibria and the possibility that there are costs and benefits of holding office.     

Is firm-sponsored training a palliative? A common agency approach

We analyse the issue of firm-sponsored training under product market imperfections. In this setting, qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students/workers. Students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education: universities sell training to both. We prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more competitive economies/industries while the share of firms in the financing of training is a monotonically decreasing function of the degree of competition. An increase of the latter indeed increases the equilibrium skilled wage while reducing its sensitivity to an increase of the supply of skilled workers. The firms’ aggregate expenditures on training per worker are nevertheless a nonmonotonic function of the competitiveness of the economy.