Transportation conditions and access to services in a context of urban sprawl and deregulation. The case of Dar es Salaam

Major deficiencies in urbanisation and transportation systems are reinforcing patterns of social and urban segregation in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's largest city. Analysis of the 1993 Human Resources Development Survey shows that there are numerous obstacles to the daily travel of the city's inhabitants, notably the poor. These barriers weigh heavily on schedules, complicate access to services ever further, limit the use of urban space, and place considerable pressure on household budgets. Consequently, the poorest individuals tend to retreat into their neighbourhood where the low-quality urban facilities are unable to assist in the development of human and social capital and economic opportunities, the alleviation of poverty or the prevention of social exclusion.     

Consumer decision making,E-commerce and perceived risks

This article studies how adoption and usage behaviour of the Internet and online shopping, respectively influence the preference to use electronic commerce to purchase different types of products. We empirically model the preference for electronic commerce when consumers have to buy different types of products and thus face different types of risks (Cox and Rich, 1964 Cox, D and Rich, S. 1964. Perceived risk and consumer decision making-the case of telephone survey. Journal of Marketing Research, 1: 32–9. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Unlike previous research, we find that consumers who have previously shopped online, display stronger preferences to buy products on the Internet irrespective of the perceived level of product-specific risks of online shopping. This article provides an interesting and novel insight into how both adoption and usage of electronic commerce impact on the attitude and risk perception of buying less predictable (more risky) products on the Internet.     

Transmission of Rice Prices from Thailand into West African Markets: The Case of Benin,Mali, and Senegal

ABSTRACT

The integration of West African rice market to the world market is assessed in order to derive the implication for food security. To this end, the transmission of rice price changes on the world market to selected markets in West Africa was examined to test for the presence of transaction costs. Using the two-regime threshold cointegration procedure on monthly price data, evidence in support of the hypothesis of asymmetric price transmission was found between Thailand and some West African markets. Price increases on the world market were more quickly transmitted to domestic price than were price decreases in Benin and Mali, suggesting short-run dynamic inefficiencies and the presence of transaction costs. In Senegal, the adjustment was linear, suggesting greater integration with the world rice market. The results suggest that West African governments should design and implement adequate policies to develop the domestic rice sector, improve market infrastructures in order to reduce their country dependency to international markets and ensure food security.     

The curse of knowledge: having access to customer information can reduce monopoly profits

We show that a monopolist's profit is higher if he refrains from collecting coarse information on his customers, sticking to constant uniform pricing rather than recognizing customers' segments through their purchase history. In the Markov perfect equilibrium with coarse information collection, after each commitment period, a new introductory price is offered to attract new customers, creating a new market segment for price discrimination. Eventually, the whole market is covered. Shortening the commitment period results in lower profits. These results sharply differ from the ones obtained when the firm can uncover the exact willingness-to-pay of each previous customer.     

Equilibrium Tariff Schedules In Commercial Policy Games Under Uncertainty

Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome.     

PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION UNDER TRACKING ERROR AND WEIGHTS CONSTRAINTS

The performance of active portfolio managers who must comply with a weights constraint is often assessed against a benchmark. The weights constraint is common as the funds are committed by their own prospectus to a minimum (or maximum) portfolio concentration. We characterize the optimal asset allocation and analyze the implications of the weights constraint on the manager's performance and on the relevance of the information ratio. We obtain that because of the weights constraint, at the optimum, the information ratio often decreases when the manager is free to deviate more from the benchmark.     

A Case of Mistaken Identity? Measuring Rates of Improved Seed Adoption in Tanzania Using DNA Fingerprinting

Studies of improved seed adoption in developing countries are almost always based on household surveys and are premised on the assumption that farmers can accurately self-report their use of improved seed varieties. However, recent studies suggest that farmers’ reports of seed varieties planted, or even whether the seed is local or improved, are sometimes inconsistent with the DNA fingerprinting results of those crops. We use household survey data from Tanzania to test the alignment between farmer-reported and DNA-identified maize seed types planted. In the sample, 70% of maize seed observations are correctly reported as local or improved, while 16% are type I errors (falsely reported as improved) and 14% are type II errors (falsely reported as local). Type I errors are more likely to have been sourced from other farmers, rather than formal channels. An analysis of input use, including seed, fertiliser, and labour allocations, reveals that farmers tend to treat improved maize differently, depending on whether they correctly perceive it as improved. This suggests that errors in farmers’ seed type awareness may translate into suboptimal management practices. The average yield of seed that is correctly identified as improved is almost 700 kg per hectare greater than that of type I errors. This indicates that investments in farmers’ access to information, seed labelling, and seed system oversight are needed to complement investments in seed variety development.