Press Advertising and the Political Differentiation of Newspapers

The press industry depends in a crucial way on the possibility of financing an important fraction of its activities by advertising receipts. We show that this may induce the editors of the newspapers to moderate the political message they display to their readers, compared with the political opinions they would have expressed otherwise.     

How well do classical credit risk pricing models fit swap transaction data?

Currency and interest rate swaps are subject to a complex, two-sided default risk. Several theoretical papers have recently addressed the problem of pricing this swap credit risk. We implement a recent credit risk pricing model in an attempt to evaluate one of the main lines of research in theoretical credit risk analysis. We compare the model's analytical results to actual transaction data thanks to a unique academic database on swap transaction data.     

The curse of knowledge: having access to customer information can reduce monopoly profits

We show that a monopolist's profit is higher if he refrains from collecting coarse information on his customers, sticking to constant uniform pricing rather than recognizing customers' segments through their purchase history. In the Markov perfect equilibrium with coarse information collection, after each commitment period, a new introductory price is offered to attract new customers, creating a new market segment for price discrimination. Eventually, the whole market is covered. Shortening the commitment period results in lower profits. These results sharply differ from the ones obtained when the firm can uncover the exact willingness-to-pay of each previous customer.     

Is partial privatization of universities a solution for higher education?

This paper accounts simply for the link between higher education and the productive economy through educated workers. We study a model of vertical successive monopolies where students/workers acquire qualification from a University then “sell” skilled labor to a monopoly which itself sells its final product to consumers, linking through quality the education sector to the labor and output markets. We determine the optimal share the State should keep in the University to compensate for the market imperfections, while taking into account the inefficiencies of public management. The resulting partially privatized University fixes the tuition fees so as to maximize a weighted sum of profits and social welfare. We derive the optimal public share under the hypothesis that the State may subsidize the tuition fees/University losses, then under the constraint that the University should make a nonnegative profit. We prove that in both cases, the State should keep a substantial share (higher under the first hypothesis) in the University, unless public management is too inefficient in which case the University's management should be completely private.     

Low prices cum selective distribution versus high prices: how best to signal quality?

We investigate the best signalling strategy for a monopoly introducing a new product with unobservable quality when second-period sales are linked to first-period ones and the firm may tailor its distribution network to exclude some consumers. When producing a high quality product rather than a low quality one is relatively costly with respect to the increase in quality, optimal signalling is by price alone. But when the cost differential is lower, it will be optimal to set a low first-period price, not to serve all would-be consumers at this price (selective distribution) and raise the price afterwards. Paradoxically, this strategy allows a larger customer base to be reached than in the case of pure price signalling.     

Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model

We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and one or two firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. The question in this paper is whether a decentralized choice through majority vote would lead to more or less competition. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the viewpoint of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, under concentrated ownership (where owners have a null density), duopoly is always preferred by the majority; while under egalitarian ownership (where firms are equally shared by all the population), the choice of the majority depends on the relative size of workers' and consumers' segments.     

The determination of public tuition fees in a mixed education system: A majority voting model

We study the determination of public tuition fees through majority voting in a vertical differentiation model where agents' returns on educational investment differ and public and private universities coexist and compete in tuition fees. The private university offers higher educational quality than its competitor, incurring higher unit cost per trained student. The tuition fee for the state university is fixed by majority voting while that for the private follows from profit maximization. Then agents choose to train at the public university or the private one or to remain uneducated. The tax per head adjusts in order to balance the state budget. Because there is a private alternative, preferences for education are not single‐peaked and no single‐crossing condition holds. An equilibrium is shown to exist, which is one of three types: high tuition fee (the “ends” are a majority), low tuition fee (the “middle” is a majority), or mixed (votes tie). The cost structure determines which equilibrium obtains. The equilibrium tuition is either greater (majority at the ends) or smaller (majority at the middle) than the optimal one.     

Should Banks Be Banned From Creating Money? An Analysis From the Perspective of Hierarchical Money

We extend the concept of “hierarchy of money” to our current monetary and financial system based on fiat money, with monetary policy that is conducted through the sale and purchase of securities and credit intermediation by non-bank financial intermediaries. This exposes a feedback loop between the upper and lower level of the hierarchy, which allows for more than full use of otherwise dormant capital, but that also increases inherent instabilities manifested in asset booms and busts. From the perspective of hierarchical money, we find that the call to ban banks from creating money neglects the significant role of securities-based financing in the global financial markets at the lower level, as well as the money creation capacity of central banks at the highest level of the hierarchy. Moreover, the inherently expansive nature of the hierarchy of money contradicts the long-term feasibility of full-reserve banking.     

Sur l'intervention de l'état dans le financement du logement

Magri, S. 1972: Politique du logement et besoins en main d'?uvre. Pinçon, M. 1976: Les HLM. Structure sociale de la population logée, agglomération de Paris. Harvey, D. 1973: Social justice and the city Roberts, J. T. 1976: General improvement areas. Farnborough: National Community Development Project 1975: The poverty of the improvement programme. Lindberg, L. N., Alford, R., Crouch, C. and Offe, C. , editors, 1975: Stress and contradiction in modern capitalism. Perlman, J. E. 1976: The myth of marginality: urban poverty and politics in Rio de Janeiro. Granelle, J-J. 1975: La valeur du sol urbain et la propriété foncière: le marché des terrains à Paris.     

Inferring fundamental value and crash nonlinearity from bubble calibration

Identifying unambiguously the presence of a bubble in an asset price remains an unsolved problem in standard econometric and financial economic approaches. A large part of the problem is that the fundamental value of an asset is, in general, not directly observable and it is poorly constrained to calculate. Further, it is not possible to distinguish between an exponentially growing fundamental price and an exponentially growing bubble price. In this paper, we present a series of new models based on the Johansen–Ledoit–Sornette (JLS) model, which is a flexible tool to detect bubbles and predict changes of regime in financial markets. Our new models identify the fundamental value of an asset price and a crash nonlinearity from a bubble calibration. In addition to forecasting the time of the end of a bubble, the new models can also estimate the fundamental value and the crash nonlinearity, meaning that identifying the presence of a bubble is enabled by these models. In addition, the crash nonlinearity obtained in the new models presents a new approach to possibly identify the dynamics of a crash after a bubble. We test the models using data from three historical bubbles ending in crashes from different markets. They are the Hong Kong Hang Seng index 1997 crash, the S&P 500 index 1987 crash (Black Monday) and the Shanghai Composite index 2009 crash. All results suggest that the new models perform very well in describing bubbles, forecasting their ending times and estimating fundamental value and the crash nonlinearity. The performance of the new models is tested under both the Gaussian residual assumption and non-Gaussian residual assumption. Under the Gaussian residual assumption, nested hypotheses with the Wilks' statistics are used and the p-values suggest that models with more parameters are necessary. Under the non-Gaussian residual assumption, we use a bootstrap method to obtain type I and II errors of the hypotheses. All tests confirm that the generalized JLS models provide useful improvements over the standard JLS model.