Gemeinsame Netznutzung: Ein Konzept für mehr Wettbewerb in der Wasserwirtschaft

Zusammenfassung  Die Wasserwirtschaft stellt eines der letzten noch verbliebenen Infrastrukturmonopole dar. Ist die monopolistische Angebotsstruktur in diesem Sektor alternativlos oder w?re auch hier mehr Wettbewerb m?glich? An welchen Stellen der Wertsch?pfungskette sind staatliche Regulierungen unverzichtbar und wie sind sie gegebenenfalls auszugestalten, um wettbewerbliches Anbieterverhalten zu erm?glichen? Prof. Dr. Dieter Cassel, 69, ist Emeritus für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Mercator School of Management der Universit?t Duisburg-Essen; Dr. Christian Rüttgers, 29, war dort wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter und ist seit 2008 als Referent bei der Niederrheinischen Industrie- und Handelskammer Duisburg-Wesel-Kleve zu Duisburg besch?ftigt.     

Special economic zones in the People’s Republic of China

By setting up a number of special economic zones, i.e. clearly demarcated regions regulated by special commercial legislation, the Chinese leadership intended, after a period of economic isolation, to integrate China more closely into the international division of labour and to stimulate production by using foreign capital and technology. Have the special economic zones so far been able to live up to expectations? What are the prospects for the future?     

Interactive Technologies and Retailing Strategy: A Review,Conceptual Framework and Future Research Directions

During the past decade, a number of interactive technologies, including the Internet, have fundamentally transformed how retailers compete in the marketplace. In a similar vein, emerging interactive technologies can be expected to significantly alter the retailing landscape through their impact on retailing strategy and operations. Furthermore, it is conceivable that certain emerging interactive technologies will be perceived by some retailers as enablers (tools to more effectively compete in the marketplace) and by other retailers as disruptors of the present ways of doing business. Interactive technologies can either be generic, a technology that is readily available from an information technology (IT) vendor and is widely adopted by retailers, or proprietary. An interactive technology that is proprietary can enable a firm to generate economic rents from the innovation for an extended duration of time. Investing in a generic interactive technology, however, may be perceived as a cost of doing business for a retailer, and not a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage. However, a retailer's complementary resource endowments may enable the retailer to more effectively leverage a generic technology relative to its competitors and thereby achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. In this paper, we review the related literature, develop a process model delineating the mechanisms by which an interactive technology can affect and necessitate changes in retailers' strategies and identify directions for future research.     

Periphery capitalism — Without question mark

This article is a rejoinder to Professor Marion Mushkat’s contribution “Pheripheric Capitalism?” which was published in INTERECONOMICS, No. 5, May 1975.     

Terms of trade, catch-up, and home-market effect: The example of Japan

This paper explores theoretically and empirically the medium- and long-run relation of the terms of trade (ratio of traded goods prices) and economic growth of a pair of countries—one of which experiences a major catch-up process towards the other. Two theoretical interdependencies between the terms of trade and economic growth are offered: the home-market effect and the productivity-shock effect. These two effects are tested against each other in a cointegration analysis on data for Japan and the US from 1971 until 1997. Income is cointegrated with the terms of trade. The relevant empirical channel is the home-market effect. However, financial-market effects appear also to be relevant. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (4) (2007) 470–488.     

A cost-minimization approach to the international transfer of HRM/IR practices: Anglo-Saxon multinationals in the Federal Republic of Germany

The existence of host-country and country-of-origin effects is analysed by using the concept of fiscal federalism as a theoretical analogy. It is argued that multinationals try to minimize the costs of centralization and decentralization associated with cross-national personnel policy. The higher the costs of decentralization, the more likely is the existence of country-of-origin effects. The opposite holds true for increasing costs of centralization. This is tested empirically by comparing the human resource management and industrial relations (HRM/IR) practices of US and British subsidiaries operating in Germany with those of native German firms. Based on 297 valid cases, it is shown that the existence of decentralization costs is associated with country-of-origin effects in various areas of personnel management, such as the use of variable compensation, employee ownership and initial vocational training. In contrast, in the field of industrial relations (co-determination, compliance with collective bargaining), there are strong pressures to adapt to local norms, leading to host-country effects. These results indicate that a rationalistic cost-minimization approach is well suited to explaining the patterns of host- and home-country effects in regard to the HRM/IR practices of multinational enterprises.