Simultaneous Pooled Auctions

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction.     

Green decisions: demographics and consumer understanding of environmental labels

This research examined the demographic profiles of Australian green consumers in relation to their satisfaction of environmental labelling. It examined consumers’ understanding of labelling and empirically investigated the association of demographic profile of consumers with their attitudes towards such labels. The results indicated that some of the demographic variables were significant, which is largely consistent with earlier findings by other researchers in this area. Label dissatisfaction was higher in the older and middle age respondents. However, some respondents disagreed that labels were accurate while commenting that labels were easy to understand. The key issue arising from the findings is that in order to provide perception of accuracy in labels, it is an option to use Type I or Type III labelling on products. These labels are, arguably, more credible because they are endorsed by third party labelling experts. This would come at a cost and for green products that use third party labelling, they will also have to bear in mind to keep the prices competitive.     

Run theorems for low returns and large banks

In this paper, we revisit the issue of bank fragility in the Diamond and Dybvig (J Polit Econ 91:401–419, 1983) model with sequential service and finite traders. We provide a precise condition under which banks are susceptible to a run when the return on investment is low, and we show that sufficiently large banks are always susceptible to a run. One interpretation of the condition is that exposure to runs occurs when desire for consumption smoothing or predictability of preference profiles are relatively high.     

Quasiconcavity and the kernel of a separable utility

Summary. In this paper I prove that a quasiconcave separable utility function defined on an atomless space is concave. Received: August 11, 1997; revised version: October 2, 1997     

Estimating the social cost of pesticide use: An assessment from acute poisoning in Brazil

The intensive use of pesticides in countries like Brazil has ignored structural and institutional shortfalls, such as the lack of workforce training for the new, difficult to implement technologies, and the institutional vulnerability of the environmental protection, health, and safety sectors. As a result we have “invisible” or social, environmental and health costs which end up being socialised with the farmer, in general, having no incentives to recognise and internalise them. This study is intended to review and develop this problem in the light of the Brazilian reality. To this end, we make use of an empirical exercise to illustrate estimation of the social cost associated with acute poisoning by pesticide using the PREVS/IBGE data (Harvest Forecast Research) in the state of Paraná, Brazil. The results suggest that, for maize, the costs of acute poisoning could represent 64% of the benefits of using herbicides and insecticides, and, in the best of hypotheses, when some risk factors are eliminated, they may reach 8% of the benefits of the use of these products. Similarly, when we examine future scenarios for five and ten years, we find less encouraging results, as in ten years the costs of acute poisoning could reach around 85% of the benefit of using insecticides and herbicides for maize. However, there is the encouraging news that, if preventive measures were taken during this time, the gains would be considerable, about 6.5 times greater. We conclude that an assessment of the real benefits involved with pesticides in Brazil is required, principally in regard to the smallholder, where farmers need more training in the use — or even the elimination — of these hazardous substances. There are sustainable technological options available which are economically efficient, especially if we consider the social, environmental and health costs. In this context it is worth highlighting the role of regulatory measures as a mechanism which can reorient generation of negative external costs through the reduction of current incentives in the socialisation of private costs.     

First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the independent private values, first-price auction for any distribution of valuations. The equilibrium strategy is a pure strategy at the continuity points of the distribution and bids a mixed strategy at the discontinuity points of the distribution.     

The set of equilibria of first-price auctions

I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. A formula to recover the distribution of valuations for any equilibrium bidding strategy is given.