THE EFFECT OF MARKET PROXY REBALANCING POLICIES ON DETECTING ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE

In this paper, effects on the measured abnormal performance of test portfolios are compared against market proxies having the same or different rebalancing policies. Results show that the common practice of comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with equally weighted market proxies produces lower Jensen [ 7 ] alphas and lower alpha t-values. Comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with value-weighted market proxies produces higher portfolio betas and alphas, but lower alpha t-values. Finally, comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with buy-and-hold market proxies produces the most powerful tests of abnormal performance.     

The representation problem and the efficiency of the price mechanism

It is shown in this paper that the way in which an allocation is represented (net trades, final allocation, etc.) can affect the design of any realizing mechanism or incentive compatible system. The reason is that a poor choice of representation may be imposing superfluous conditions and demands upon the realizing mechanism. So, in this paper a technique is developed to (1) find the optimal representation of an allocation, and (2) to characterize the associated, realizing mechanisms. Although this approach is designed to be applied to any smooth economic model, it is illustrated and motivated here by applying it to the price mechanism. More specifically, there are assertions in the literature by Mount and Reiter and by Hurwicz that the price mechanism is informationally efficient over the class of Pareto seeking mechanisms. These proofs are incomplete because they consider only one choice of representation for the Pareto allocations. We use this technique to (a) reassert the dimensional efficiency of the price mechanism, (b) compare mechanisms for spaces of economics with and without externalities, (c) characterize for the space of quadratic functions the other dimensionally efficient allocation concepts, and (d) characterize those two agent economics where the price mechanism is dimensionally efficient.     

When Are Commercial Loans Secured?

We analyze the factors that influence the decision to secure a commercial loan. We find evidence that variables reflecting adverse selection, moral hazard, and the prospects for default all affect the likelihood a loan will be collateralized. We find no evidence in favor of the predictions of certain theoretical models that high‐quality firms signal by providing collateral. Our results also show that lenders with less risk protection in the form of equity capital are more likely to require collateral, but that banks themselves are less likely to secure loans than nonbanks. Certain loan characteristics also influence the collateralization decision.     

The effects of zoning on population and employment density

This article examines zoning's impacts on population and employment density. It develops a model to explore the effects of zoning on the density of residential and nonresidential land use. Drawing on this model, density gradients that incorporate the effects of zoning are estimated for Greensboro, North Carolina. The model is used to simulate the effects of a change in restrictive-use residential zoning. The simulation shows that a 1 percent increase in the level of restrictive-use residential zoning across all neighborhoods in the city is associated with a 0.3 percent increase in gross population density and a 0.1 percent decline in net density (intensity). It suggests that restrictive-use zoning affects both the density and the intensity of residential land use through its effects on the value of residential land.     

Toward a theory of consumerism

Consumerism is not unique to modern times or to the United States. Eight hypotheses explaining the movement arc based on history, sociology, law, economics, and psychology.