ON THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUM REVISIONS ON LARGE,PUBLICLY TRADED COMMERCIAL BANKS

Evidence is provided from changes in deposit insurance premiums in the early 1990s on the validity of the premium absorption hypothesis and the premium shifting hypothesis. Analysis of abnormal market returns associated with deposit insurance events using a market‐model event‐study methodology suggests that reductions in deposit insurance premiums are associated with increases in the market value of banking organizations; conversely, increases in deposit insurance premiums are associated with decreases in market wealth. The largest banks in the sample and banks with low equity capital (and low risk‐based capital ratios) appear to be most affected. These results are generally consistent with the premium absorption hypothesis but inconsistent with the premium shifting hypothesis.     

Counter-intuitive results in game theory

General comparative game statics results are derived in order to provide testable hypotheses in game-like situations. These results run counter to ordinary economic intuition. It becomes necessary to initially define whether a situation represents perfect competition or monopoly on the one hand or a game-like situation on the other hand because these different assumptions lead to greatly differing results. Several empirical applications of the theory are suggested.     

Learning and fatigue during choice experiments: a comparison of online and mail survey modes

This study investigates the effect of survey mode on respondent learning and fatigue during repeated choice experiments. Stated preference data are obtained from an experiment concerning high‐speed Internet service conducted on samples of mail respondents and online respondents. We identify and estimate aspects of the error components for different subsets of the choice questions, for both mail and online respondents. Results show mail respondents answer questions consistently throughout a series of choice experiments, but the quality of the online respondents' answers declines. Therefore, while the online survey provides lower survey administration costs and reduced time between implementation and data analysis, such benefits come at the cost of less precise responses. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recycling consumer solid waste: A commentary on selected channel alternatives

The recycling of consumer solid waste presents special problems for reverse marketing channels. Specifically, the accumulation of bulk quantities of homogenous materials from consumer-generated sources that are highly heterogenous in nature represents a major functional problem that must be overcome through the development of appropriate reverse marketing channels. In this article, factors influencing reverse channels development are outlined, and specific marketing implications concerning the three basic channel types that primarily handle consumer solid waste are discussed.     

THE EFFECT OF MARKET PROXY REBALANCING POLICIES ON DETECTING ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE

In this paper, effects on the measured abnormal performance of test portfolios are compared against market proxies having the same or different rebalancing policies. Results show that the common practice of comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with equally weighted market proxies produces lower Jensen [ 7 ] alphas and lower alpha t-values. Comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with value-weighted market proxies produces higher portfolio betas and alphas, but lower alpha t-values. Finally, comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with buy-and-hold market proxies produces the most powerful tests of abnormal performance.     

The representation problem and the efficiency of the price mechanism

It is shown in this paper that the way in which an allocation is represented (net trades, final allocation, etc.) can affect the design of any realizing mechanism or incentive compatible system. The reason is that a poor choice of representation may be imposing superfluous conditions and demands upon the realizing mechanism. So, in this paper a technique is developed to (1) find the optimal representation of an allocation, and (2) to characterize the associated, realizing mechanisms. Although this approach is designed to be applied to any smooth economic model, it is illustrated and motivated here by applying it to the price mechanism. More specifically, there are assertions in the literature by Mount and Reiter and by Hurwicz that the price mechanism is informationally efficient over the class of Pareto seeking mechanisms. These proofs are incomplete because they consider only one choice of representation for the Pareto allocations. We use this technique to (a) reassert the dimensional efficiency of the price mechanism, (b) compare mechanisms for spaces of economics with and without externalities, (c) characterize for the space of quadratic functions the other dimensionally efficient allocation concepts, and (d) characterize those two agent economics where the price mechanism is dimensionally efficient.     

When Are Commercial Loans Secured?

We analyze the factors that influence the decision to secure a commercial loan. We find evidence that variables reflecting adverse selection, moral hazard, and the prospects for default all affect the likelihood a loan will be collateralized. We find no evidence in favor of the predictions of certain theoretical models that high‐quality firms signal by providing collateral. Our results also show that lenders with less risk protection in the form of equity capital are more likely to require collateral, but that banks themselves are less likely to secure loans than nonbanks. Certain loan characteristics also influence the collateralization decision.