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31.
We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firms earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation. 相似文献
32.
Donald G. Saari 《Economic Theory》2000,15(1):1-53
Summary. A theory is developed to identify, characterize, and explain all possible positional and pairwise voting outcomes that can occur for any number of alternatives and any profile. This paper describes pairwise voting where new results include explanations for all paradoxes, cycles, conflict between Borda and Condorcet rankings, differences among procedures using pairwise votes (such as the Borda Count, Kemeny's method, and the Arrow-Raynaud rule), and discrepancies among the societal rankings as candidates are dropped or added. Other new results include new relationships among the Borda and Condorcet "winners" and "losers." The theory also shows how to construct all supporting profiles. The following companion paper does the same for positional methods. 相似文献
33.
Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even
when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending
on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No
individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed
individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined.
Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001
We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université
de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and
to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors
was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of
Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support. 相似文献
34.
This paper develops a predictive model which includes game, team and university specific factors that are likely to influence game day demand for Division 1‐A college football. Attendance during the 1997 regular season is used as the dependent variable. Tobit estimates of two separate equations reveal that the quality of both teams, traditional rivalry and membership of specific conferences have a significant influence on demand. In addition, colleges with lower enrollments and a higher percentage of off‐campus students attract smaller crowds. The presence of a nearby professional football team also detracts from a college team's drawing power. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
35.
Performance lies arise both from individual and from situational causes, but in this article, the attention is on situational causes. These are generally triggered by loyalty to the coalition, which is expressed through the continued use of performance lies. Because performance lies help create a boundary around the coalition that insulates its activities from top management, performance lies enable members of the coalition to exercise a greater degree of internal control. Naturally, such lies are dysfunctional, resulting in the avoidance of difficult issues and problems and compromising the organization's ability to adapt to a changing environment based on accurate information. 相似文献
36.
We develop a model of competition between shopping centers, comparing competitive outcomes in three alternative modes of retail organization, namely: streets (in which neither developers or retailers internalize agglomeration effects between products); malls (in which developers internalize); and supermarkets (in which both developers and retailers internalize). For a fixed number of centers: (i) converting streets to malls intensifies developer (but not retailer) competition, which increases product range (i.e., the number of shops built by the developers) and consumer surplus, reduces profits, and has ambiguous effects on welfare; (ii) converting streets to supermarkets intensifies retailer and developer competition, has ambiguous effects on product range (number of shops), reduces profits, and increases social welfare. With free entry both conversions reduce the number of centers and, if there is excess entry, conversion to supermarkets (but not malls) unambiguously increases welfare. 相似文献
37.
This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n>3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309). 相似文献
38.
Changes in total surplus are traditional measures of economic welfare. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for
rationalizing individual and aggregate consumer demand data with individual quasilinear and homothetic utility functions.
Under these conditions, consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer welfare. For nonmarketed goods, we propose necessary
and sufficient conditions on input market data for efficient production, i.e. production at minimum cost. Under these conditions
we derive a cost function for the nonmarketed good, where producer surplus is the area above the marginal cost curve.
We are greatful to helpful remarks and comments of the referees and the editor. The work is partially supported by the Spanish
Ministry of Science and Technology, through Grant BEC2002-2130, the Generalitat de Catlaunya, through Grant 2005SGR-00454
and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). 相似文献
39.
We consider the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to agents in a fair and efficient manner. In a recent paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin consider the case in which all agents have strict preferences, and propose the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism; they define a new notion of efficiency, called ordinal efficiency, and prove that the probabilistic serial mechanism finds an envy-free ordinally efficient assignment. However, the restrictive assumption of strict preferences is critical to their algorithm. Our main contribution is an analogous algorithm for the full preference domain in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Our algorithm is based on a reinterpretation of the PS mechanism as an iterative algorithm to compute a “flow” in an associated network. In addition we show that on the full preference domain it is impossible for even a weak strategyproof mechanism to find a random assignment that is both ordinally efficient and envy-free. 相似文献
40.
G. Donald Jud 《American journal of economics and sociology》1984,43(3):313-322
Abstract . The migration model presented in this paper indicates (hat the academic quality of public schools, independent of their racial composition, is an important determinant of in-migration in North Carolina counties. The failure to control for school quality is shown to lead to a significant overestimate of the negative impact of school racial mix. These results accord with the Tiebout Hypothesis and with a growing body of other research which suggests that the distributions of public services and other amenities are the principal determinants of recent migration patterns in the U.S. 相似文献