Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection

Summary This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents' beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.Notation ={ ₁,..., _k } set of outcomes - : ₊ generic contract or lottery - A = () ; - A_o A{, where denotes the null contract or no trade - S={1,...,¦S¦} set of seller types - L(s) number of type-s sellers - M number of buyers - u: × S seller's utility function, which can be extended toA× S by puttingu(, s) ; - v. × S buyer's utility function, which can be extended toA × S by puttingv(, s) ; - f:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of sellers - g:A ₀ ×S ₊ allocation of buyers - A ₊ sellers' trading function - :A ×S ₊ buyers' trading function This paper has had a long gestation period, during which I have been influenced by helpful conversations with many persons, by their work, or both. Among those who deserve special mention are Martin Hellwig, Roger Myerson, Edward Prescott, Robert Townsend and Yves Younés. Earlier versions were presented to the NBER/CEME Conference on Decentralization at the University of Toronto and the NBER Conference on General Equilibrium at Brown University. I would like to thank John Geanakoplos, Walter Heller, Andreu Mas Colell, Michael Peters, Michel Poitevin, Lloyd Shapley, John Wooders, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and especially Robert Rosenthal for his careful reading of two drafts. The financial support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 912202 is gratefully acknowledged.     

The sales recovery audit: Learning to walk the talk

Little research attention has been devoted to the impact of salesperson failure and recovery management on customer relationship development. This paper develops a theoretically anchored and externally validated sales recovery audit for the purpose of assessing sales organization performance in these matters. Results based on a survey of 177 sales managers indicate that practice of sales recovery efforts lags behind their perceived importance as they relate to organizational success. The sales recovery audit presented here can be a useful tool to continuously evaluate and enhance sales recovery efforts for the purpose of building a stronger relationship selling organization.     

The effect and moderation of gender identity congruity: Utilizing “real women” advertising images

The present article examines the predictive ability of gender identity congruity in explaining women's responses to advertising appeals. The contributions of the article are twofold: (1) to demonstrate whether advertisements that are congruent with female consumers' gender identities elicit strong positive responses and (2) to identify the factors that moderate/mediate the impact of gender identity congruity on consumer responses to advertisements. The research findings provide evidence of the ability of gender identity congruity to elicit positive responses to advertising appeals. The relationship between gender identity congruity and responses to the advertisement is mediated by advertising involvement. The moderating roles of national culture, physical concern, and physical view are also supported. Overall, the congruity theory provides a powerful framework to examine consumer responses to gender portrayals in advertising. ©2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Building the high-flex/high-value HR team

In many companies, the human resources function is considered necessary, but minimally important. Douglas Ready strongly disagrees and argues that a shoddy HR function will keep the rest of the company from high achievement. It's time to develop the people who are in charge of developing everyone else.     

Forging the new talent compact

It is difficult to attract and keep top talent, acknowledges Douglas Ready , but he believes that your company's culture and climate are key to creating a system that works.     

Multiple-objective methods in regulatory decision making: A conceptual framework applied to U.S. automobile safety standards

Public policy making is a complex matter. Policy makers are charged with balancing a broad spectrum of competing objectives, reflecting in varying degrees the interests and aspirations of a diverse range of constituencies and stakeholders. Policy decisions have differential impacts on differing constituencies and the contributions of these impacts to objectives are frequently uncertain, difficult to quantify, and hotly disputed. Formal methods of decision analysis have been advanced as aids for coping with complexity and have been applied to some public policy issues, most notably the management of water resources. While formal methods have the apparent benefit of rationalizing the policy process and improving the efficacy and equity of policy decisions, serious questions remain concerning the acceptability and ultimate usefulness of formal analyses in the public arena. In this article we examine these questions in the context of policy making relating to government regulation of automobile designs for safety. We consider what would be involved in attempting to use a relatively modern, multiple-objective approach in this context. The key questions are how and, more importantly, why multiple-objective methods might be used. The article begins with an illustrative case study, describes the current policymaking process, identifies the parties involved in and affected by this process, elicits key objectives, looks briefly at some scalar-objective approaches, and then outlines a multiple-objective approach. The framework developed arguably is useful in assisting policy making, at least at a qualitative level. Issues which impede a more quantitative resolution of this framework are discussed. This article is intended as a pilot study which may promote research toward the achievement of a useable multiple-objective procedure applicable in the public domain.     

Hedge Fund Regulation and Misreported Returns

This paper introduces a cross‐country law and finance analysis of the misreporting behaviour in the hedge fund industry in terms of smoothing returns so that a fund consistently generates positive returns. We find strong evidence that international differences in hedge fund regulation are significantly associated with the propensity of fund managers to misreport monthly returns. We find a positive association between wrappers and misreporting, particularly for funds that do not have a lockup provision. Also, we find some evidence that misreporting is less common among funds in jurisdictions with minimum capitalisation requirements and restrictions on the location of key service providers. We assess the robustness of our finds to a number of specifications, including, different specifications of misreporting bin widths, subsets of the data by fund type, as well as specifications controlling for collinearity and selection effects and other robustness checks. We show misreporting significantly affects capital allocation, and calculate the wealth transfer effects of misreporting and relate this wealth transfer to differences in hedge fund regulation.     

Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Exchange Rate Pass‐through: The Role of Regime Changes

We consider the effect on the degree of exchange rate pass‐through of the exchange rate regime in operation. We test the hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower under a float as firms may be reluctant to pass appreciations or depreciations on to their customers when there is a strong chance that they will be subsequently reversed. Taylor’s hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower in a low‐inflation environment is also considered. Both hypotheses are assessed in relation to the price of manufactured imports into New Zealand and we find that, whereas the shift to a float dramatically lowered the degree of pass‐through, the later shift to a low‐inflation regime has no significant additional effect on the pass‐through relationship.