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891.
Recreation Demand and Residential Location 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We use the properties of competitive location equilibrium to study the demand for recreation and the choice of primary residence location. Location-specific recreation and employment lead to pooling equilibria in which consumers reside according to their preference for recreation. In general, the stronger the taste for recreation, the greater the attraction of living close to the recreation site and the lower the demand for other goods, including housing. We explore the effects of trip frequency, trip length, and recreation cost on the spatial distribution of consumers. We also consider the effect of the wage rate on recreation and location demands. 相似文献
892.
Competition in the long-distance market in the US continues to intensify; the 1996 Telecommunications Act has led to increased competition in long-distance telephony especially as the Regional Bell Operating Companies have begun to gain entry to long-haul, long-distance markets. In order to better understand the implications of having increased service offerings, models of how customers choose between carriers (and the impact of this choice on subsequent usage) will be useful. We develop the first publicly available models that simultaneously estimate choice and usage for intraLATA long-distance in the US. Utilizing a generalized Tobit model, the price responsiveness of usage and carrier choice are estimated. The results are generally consistent with expectations both in terms of theory and of practical experience in the industry. 相似文献
893.
894.
Based upon a review of the extant literature, it is proposed that the structure of an interorganizational relationship is composed of relationship type and the under‐researched construct of relationship magnitude. Specifically, it is hypothesized that relationship magnitude, a second order construct composed of trust, commitment, and dependence, affects relationship type, which affects the perception of value of the relationship. The results of a survey analyzed through structural equation modeling support these hypotheses. 相似文献
895.
Cross‐listings of equities internationally are becoming more common. Using data for Europe and North America, previous studies reject the order flow diversion hypothesis, which states that international cross‐listings reduce home‐country trading volume. We test this hypothesis using data for equities cross‐listed in Singapore and Malaysia. We find that trading volume in Malaysia fell 42.9% when Singapore markets were closed for holidays. Furthermore, we show that trading volume in Malaysia did not increase following the implementation of regulations that ended the trading of Malaysian equities in Singapore in 1998. Hence, we reject the order flow diversion hypothesis. 相似文献
896.
Steven V. Mann 《The Journal of Financial Research》2002,25(4):593-594
897.
We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated. 相似文献
898.
Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings-per-share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities. 相似文献
899.
900.
Political entrepreneurship occurs when an individual acts on a political profit opportunity. These profit opportunities can be divided into two categories: productive, and predatory. Productive opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from enhancing the efficiency of government, while predatory opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from forcibly transferring resources from some to others. This analysis shows that political institutions tend to favor predatory over productive political entrepreneurship, and shows that what is sometimes referred to as political exchange does not have the same efficiency characteristics as voluntary exchange in private markets. 相似文献