Public Professional Accountability: A Conditional Approach

In the past decades, profession(al)s have increasingly been called to account. Several authors have reported that this increased public professional accountability, in the form of showing that professional conduct meets predefined standards or rules, has had severe negative consequences for professionals, their clients and society, and call for ‘intelligent’ forms of accountability; forms of accountability that may inform a wider public about professional conduct but do not harm it. In this paper, we propose a form of ‘intelligent’ public professional accountability. Taking Freidson’s (Professionalism. The third logic, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001) notion of institutional ethics as a point of departure, we develop a form of accountability that seeks to account for the conditions required for professional conduct. The paper first discusses the current ‘dilemma of professional accountability,’ describes ‘ideal-type professional conduct’ and goes into the conditions it requires. Next, it shows what accounting for these conditions entails and that this form of accountability fits the criteria for intelligent accountability, as set by O’Neill (in: Morris and Vines (eds.) Capital failure: rebuilding trust in financial services, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014).     

The economic burden of common adverse events associated with metastatic colorectal cancer treatment in the United States

Aims: Adverse events (AEs) associated with treatments for metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC) may compromise the course of treatment, impact quality-of-life, and increase healthcare resource utilization. This study assessed the direct healthcare costs of common AEs among mCRC patients in the US.

Methods: Adult mCRC patients treated with chemotherapy or targeted therapies were identified from administrative claims databases (2009–2014). Up to the first three mCRC treatment episodes per patient were considered and categorized as with or without the AE system/organ category during the episode. Total healthcare costs (2014 USD) were measured by treatment episode and reported on a monthly basis. Treatment episodes with the AE category were matched by treatment type and line of treatment to those without the AE category. Adjusted total cost differences were estimated by comparing costs during treatment episodes with vs without the AE category using multivariate regression models; p-values were estimated with bootstrap.

Results: A total of 4158 patients with ≥1 mCRC treatment episode were included (mean age?=?59 years; 58% male; 60% with liver and 14% with lung metastases; 2,261 [54%] with a second and 1,115 [27%] with a third episode). On average, two treatment episodes were observed per patient with an average length of 166 days per episode. Adjusted monthly total cost difference by AE category included hematologic ($1,480), respiratory ($1,253), endocrine/metabolic ($1,213), central nervous system (CNS; $1,136), and cardiovascular ($1,036; all p?Limitations: Claims do not include information on the cause of AEs, and potentially less severe AEs may not have been reported by the physician when billing the medical service. This study aimed to assess the association between costs and AEs and not the causation of AEs by treatment.

Conclusions: The most costly AEs among mCRC patients were hematologic, followed by respiratory, endocrine/metabolic, CNS, and cardiovascular.     

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. For a special case, we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities. We also find that the uniqueness result in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] is robust to our form of agency, but that the non-uniqueness result in Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123] is not.     

MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP,COLLUSION AND UNUSUAL RESULT PATTERNS IN SOCCER

Expanding on the literature on antitrust, multiple ownership, and collusion in sports, this paper finds a very unusual result pattern between two clubs competing in the Croatian soccer league—Lokomotiva and Dinamo Zagreb. Their close sporting and business relationship has raised many questions about the possible collusion between them, potentially affecting the integrity of the competition. We analyze all matchups in the competition's 25‐year history to single out those characterized by biggest under‐ and overperformances by competing clubs. Our findings provide some support to the allegations of a possible collusion between the clubs as Lokomotiva's underperformance against Dinamo is so far in the tail of normal distribution that it has a lower occurrence probability than a random person being hit by lightning. (JEL Z29, K21, L83).     

Understanding Top Management and Organizational Change Through Demographic and Processual Analysis*

abstract Top management theory has been strongly influenced by demographic studies of top management teams (TMTs), but not by research into organizational adaptation to conditions of extreme institutional turbulence. This article analyses the transformation of a post‐socialist enterprise through a combination of demographic and processual methods to develop an enriched account of the micro‐processes through which top management constructed organizational change. Adding layers of narrative data and processual explanation directly addresses the well rehearsed problems in demographic TMT studies. From the findings, we propose a set of theoretical arguments that conceptualizes top management in terms of management regimes, to which TMTs are politically tied and through which they seek to realize their values and strategies in organizational outcomes.     

Making territorial scenarios for Europe

Three paradigmatic traditions of scenario-building can be seen to exist. The model approach with its roots in American military scenarios of the 1950s, the design approach in French urban and regional development of the 1960s, and the strategic conversation approach in scenarios made in the private sector since the 1970s. In theory, these traditions can be integrated by organising the scenario project in a cyclical way. The territorial scenarios for Europe were made by combining workshops, a literature review and modelling. Thematic scenarios were produced for various themes, like demography, the economy, energy, and climate change. These thematic scenarios were combined into four integrated scenarios. The robustness of the scenarios was tested by introducing several “wild cards” and by exploring their territorial impacts throughout Europe. This applied approach succeeded in combining important strengths from the different scenario traditions. Improvements, however, could still be made.     

Consumers engaged in a member-gets-member campaign: an agency perspective

In this article, the use of member-gets-member-campaigns is perceived as an agency problem: the agent (a consumer) is going to take some action on the principal's behalf (a manufacturer). However, before the principal decides to engage the agent in their member-gets-member campaign, the principal needs to know whether a particular agent has the appropriate characteristics and whether the agent will have the proper motivations to behave in accordance with the principal's goals. Moreover, the principal needs to know how the agent's ideas and behaviour can be changed. In this article, concepts from opinion leadership, social network theory and attitude research are used to test and evaluate the characteristics of the agent, who voluntarily participated in a member-gets-member campaign of a large producer of several brands of dog food. The outcomes show that agents that participate in the member-gets-member campaigns have characteristics which might be desirable for the manufacturer: these agents are opinion leaders and have a positive brand attitude. To some extent, these agents also ask permission from the consumer whether they are allowed to make them members and seek membership from people with whom they have close ties. The results also show that the agents positively respond to incentives used by the manufacturer. In general, the agents are not motivated to oversell the membership to the consumers.     

Union commitment and participation among Hong Kong firefighters: a development of an integrative model

This paper examines the factors influencing members' intent to participate in their union, drawing on a study of Hong Kong firefighters. As in Western studies, the main direct predictor of intent to participate is affective union commitment, but instrumentality is a relatively more important antecedent of affective union commitment and participation than in the Western studies. We found some evidence of frustration-aggression effects on intent to participate in ‘militant’ and ‘general’ union activities, although the latter was significant only among individuals who perceive management–employee relations as co-operative and trusting.