Graphic Geopolitics: An Interview with Comics Artist Joe Sacco

Joe Sacco is best known for works that blend journalism with the format and structure of comic books. Sacco’s prior work has considered themes of political conflict, legacies of violence, and marginalization across a range of geographic contexts, including Bosnia, the Middle East, and the United States. This interview, conducted by the authors with Joe Sacco on 16 November 2015, explores these and other themes in an attempt to situate the positionality and choices of the creator of geopolitical narratives in the broader literature on critical geopolitics. We consider the themes of subject, representation, audience response, and stylistic influences, among others, in our conversation.     

Snapshot samples

We consider a coverage model where an initial event that occurs at some point in time triggers an activity of random duration that leads to some subsequent event. A snapshot sample is constructed at a fixed point in chronological time either by sampling only subjects where the initial event has occurred but the subsequent event has yet to occur (active subjects), or by sampling only subjects where both the initial and subsequent events have occurred (inactive subjects). The biases inherent in snapshot sampling can be neatly characterized by the properties of two random variables: the history (defined as the time the initial event occurs as measured into the past from the chronological point of sampling), and the active time (defined as the length of time between the initial and subsequent events). Though snapshot samples are biased, recognizing the biases enables correct inferences to be drawn from snapshot-sampled data. Considering only the case where and are independent random variables, this paper presents the probability models associated with snapshot sampling, demonstrates the problems that can occur, offers procedures for overcoming these problems, and applies the methods to interesting data sets.     

Spillovers,Linkages and Technical Change

Using US input–output data for the period 1958–87, I find strong evidence that industry total factor productivity (TFP) growth is significantly related to the TFP performance of the supplying sectors, with an elasticity of almost 60%. R&D intensity is also found to be a significant determinant of industry TFP growth, with an estimated return of about 10–13% and the return to embodied R&D is estimated at 43%. Direct productivity spillovers, from the technological progress made by supplying sectors, appear to be more important than spillovers from the R&D performed by suppliers. They also play a key role in explaining changes in manufacturing TFP growth over time. Changes in the contribution made by direct productivity spillovers to TFP growth account for almost half of the slowdown in TFP growth in manufacturing from 1958–67 to 1967–77, and for 20% of the TFP growth recovery in this sector from 1967–77 to 1977–87. Changes in R&D intensity and embodied R&D are relatively unimportant in explaining movements in manufacturing TFP growth over these three periods.     

Taking,giving, and impure altruism in dictator games

We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.     

Monetising the Classical Equations: a theory of circulation

The Classical Equations describe output and income in real terms.To use them to analyse aggregate demand, the transactions theydescribe must be ‘monetised’. A sum of money equalto the wage bill of the capital goods sector can be shown tobe necessary and sufficient to carry out all transactions, ina process of circulation which also defines an expression forvelocity. When money has intrinsic value, the quantity approachmay hold in the short run but, in the long run, money will beendogenous. In these conditions, the rate of interest will bedetermined by the supply and demand for reserves, but when moneyis purely nominal, only a minimum rate will be fixed, and therate of interest will have to be pegged. The Appendix developsthe Classical Equations and shows that they define an invariableunit of account.     

Water and Economic Growth

Several hydrological studies forecast a global problem of water scarcity. This raises the question as to whether increasing water scarcity may impose constraints on the growth of countries. The influence of water utilisation on economic growth is depicted through a growth model that includes this congestible nonexcludable good as a productive input for private producers. Growth is negatively affected by the government's appropriation of output to supply water but positively influenced by the contribution of increased water use to capital productivity, leading to an inverted-U relationship between economic growth and the rate of water utilisation. Cross-country estimations confirm this relationship and suggest that for most economies current rates of fresh water utilisation are not yet constraining growth. However, for a handful of countries, moderate or extreme water scarcity may adversely affect economic growth. Nevertheless, even for water-scarce countries, there appears to be little evidence that there are severe diminishing returns to allocating more output to provide water, thus resulting in falling income per capita. These results suggest caution over the claims of some hydrological-based studies of a widespread global 'water crisis'.     

The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.     

Mean-Variance Preferences and Investor Behaviour

We study the comparative statics implications of mean-variance preferences for optimal portfolios. Specifically, we show that all risk-averse mean-variance investors raise their investment in a risky asset in response to a change in that asset's return distribution if and only if the change lowers both the mean and standard deviation of the return by the same percentage. Besides being of interest in its own right, our results allow us to compare some comparative statics implications and the expected utility and mean-variance models systematically.