Communicating Data Uncertainty: Multiwave Experimental Evidence for UK GDP

Economic statistics are commonly published without estimates of their uncertainty. We conduct two waves of a randomized controlled online experiment to assess if and how the UK public understands data uncertainty. A control group observes only the point estimate of GDP. Treatment groups are presented with alternative qualitative and quantitative communications of GDP data uncertainty. We find that most of the public understands that GDP numbers are uncertain. Quantitative communications of data uncertainty help align the public's subjective probabilistic expectations of data uncertainty with objective estimates, but do not decrease trust in the statistical office.     

Effectiveness of Rural Microfinance: What We Know and What We Need to Know

The effectiveness of rural microfinance in improving livelihoods among people living in rural communities remains uncertain. This is not only because of weaknesses in the design and implementation of microfinance, but perhaps more critically because of constraints in the rural financial environment. Despite the existence of limited rigorous studies, this paper presents state‐of‐the‐art evidence on the impact of microfinance on beneficiaries, with particular emphasis on issues of rural finance, and argues that for microfinance to be more effective, not only do new impact methodologies and more diverse types of financial services need to be developed, but also, primarily, risks and operating costs need to be reduced to make rural clients more attractive to financial intermediaries.     

Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements as a network formation game. We consider an n‐country model in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. In each country, the labor market is either unionized or non‐unionized. We show that, if all countries are non‐unionized, the global free trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient network. If all countries are unionized, the global free trade network is pairwise stable and the unique efficient network among the class of symmetric networks. If some countries are unionized while others are non‐unionized, other networks apart from the global free trade network may be pairwise stable. However, the efficient network is still the global free trade network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously profitable deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.     

Free-Riding and Cooperation in Environmental Games

This paper examines the negotiation of an international environmental agreement in which different countries determine the (nonenforceable) promises of investment in clean technologies to be included in the agreement. Furthermore, it analyzes countries' optimal investment in emission-reducing technologies, considering that, in addition to the utility that a country perceives from an improved environmental quality, it is also concerned about the relative fulfillment of the terms specified in the international agreement either by itself or by others. I show, first, why countries may prefer to shift most promises of investment in clean technologies to other countries, despite the fact that these promises are usually nonenforceable by any international organization. Second, I determine countries' optimal investments in these technologies, and analyze how their particular investments depend on how demanding the international agreement is, and on the importance that countries assign to each others' relative fulfillment of their part of the treaty.