A characterization of strategic complementarities

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show that: (1) generic 2×2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities; (2) generic two-player finite ordinal potential games have complementarities.     

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EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET

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A Tale of two narratives: assessing the sociological hypothesis of the appeal of the US dollar in Argentina

Quality & Quantity - A remarkable feature of the Argentinean economy is the widespread use of the US dollar as a measure of value, storage of value and in several high-end markets, as a medium...     

Inequality and debt in a model with heterogeneous agents

We show that to account for the cross-sectional divergence in debt-to-income ratios in US data a DSGE model must assume a tax reallocation across the top- and bottom-income quantile of the population, rather than differential productivity growth, and low cost of access to financial intermediation.