Governance, Democracy and Poverty Reduction: Lessons Drawn from Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America

Public statistics face quite a challenge when it comes to measuring new dimensions of development (institutions, governance, and social and political participation). To take up this challenge, modules on Governance, Democracy and Multiple Dimensions of Poverty have been appended to household surveys by National Statistics Institutes in twelve African and Latin American developing countries. This paper presents the issues addressed and the methodological lessons learnt along with a selection of findings to illustrate this innovative approach and demonstrate its analytic potential. We investigate, for instance, the population's support for democratic principles, the respect for civil and political rights and the trust in the political class; the ‘need for the State’, particularly of the poorest; the extent of petty corruption; the reliability of expert surveys on governance; the perception of decentralization policies at local level; the level and vitality of social and political participation, etc. The conclusive appraisal made opens up prospects for the national statistical information systems in the developing countries. The measurement and tracking of this new set of objective and subjective public policy monitoring indicators would benefit from being made systematic.     

Construct validity and second-order factorial model

Three second-order factorial models are defined, using the LISREL notation, to assess the univocity of a construct. The first model assumes that the constructs are heterogeneous, the second that they are homogeneous. The third model introduces the notion of partial homogeneity between constructs. Partial homogeneity is defined in terms of a LISREL second-order factor model. In some cases, this model offers a viable alternative to the collapsing of items into a unique scale. An example is given of scales which fit the partial homogeneity model.     

Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

We analyze the interactions between investment and local wage bargaining in a putty-clay model where the investment decision commits the firm to a particular capital intensity. This technological precommitment is used strategically in order to manipulate the bargaining outcome. We show that this strategic behavior induces a nonmonotonic relationship between the capital and labor demands of the firm and most of its environmental parameters (e.g., the bargaining power of the union, its minimum wage requirement, the capital cost). The results we obtain in our putty-clay framework thus contradict several conclusions of the standard literature on wage bargaining and investment.     

The Political Economy of Education and Development in an Open Economy

If the price effect of opening up a developing economy may be expected to act as a disincentive for investment in human capital, the opposite is likely to be true of the income effect, especially in the presence of credit market imperfections among the poor. It is shown in this paper that this may no longer be the case in a society initially dominated by an oligarchic capitalist elite that is afraid of losing its political control in favor of an educated middle class. Although it may sometimes be in its interest to democratize by subsidizing education when the economy is closed, incentives to do so disappear when the economy is open to trade or factor flows.     

Tariffs versus VAT in the presence of heterogeneous firms and an informal sector

The debate over the use of tariffs or value added taxes in developing countries has focused on the difficulty of collecting VAT from the informal sector. This paper contributes by considering this issue with heterogeneous firms and endogenous entry. This yields two results. First, a cut in the tariff reduces the size of the informal sector. Second, the imposition of VAT need not increase the size of the informal sector. Turning to simulation results, we find that switching from a tariff to a revenue-neutral VAT increases welfare, in part because of the selection effect generated by heterogeneous firms.     

Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Recent research has highlighted the quantitative contribution to merger analysis from extending unilateral effects models to understand the payoffs to future potential coordinated effects. Some of the emphasis of this research appears to have made its way into the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper, we demonstrate the quantification of coordinated effects in an oligopoly and procurement model, and we show that screens that are based on upward pricing pressure are not adequate in mergers where coordinated effects are a potential concern.     

Multidimensional generalized Gini indices

Summary. The axioms that characterize the generalized Gini social evaluation orderings for one-dimensional distributions are extended to the multidimensional attributes case. A social evaluation ordering is shown to have a two-stage aggregation representation if these axioms and a separability assumption are satisfied. In the first stage, the distributions of each attribute are aggregated using generalized Gini social evaluation functions. The functional form of the second-stage aggregator depends on the number of attributes and on which version of a comonotonic additivity axiom is used. The implications of these results for the corresponding multidimensional indices of relative and absolute inequality are also considered.Received: 20 August 2003, Revised: 26 May 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D63. Correspondence to: John A. WeymarkWe are grateful to our referee for his or her comments.     

LE RENOUVELLEMENT PÉRIODIQUE DES CONTRATS DE CONCESSION: LE CAS DES SERVICES DE L'EAU

RESUME ** :  Le renouvellement régulier des contrats de concession apparaît nécessaire pour bénéficier de concurrence dans certains secteurs, comme l'eau. Nous décrivons les contrats et la règle de renouvellement optimaux dans ce contexte. Ils arbitrent entre les diminutions de coûts, en cas de changement de concessionnaire, et les incitations à investir à long terme du concessionnaire en place. La meilleure information du concessionnaire en place sur des éléments constituant une valeur commune de la concession est importante. Nous montrons que ses conséquences diffèrent fortement du cas des enchères de biens.