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Review of Industrial Organization - We derive the socially optimal allocation of liability for product-related accidents when firms delegate their output and safety choices to managers under a... 相似文献
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This paper analyzes a two-period setup in which firms differ with respect to costs of care and may use care-taking to signal
type to consumers, who are able to observe precaution taken only ex post. Applying the refinement of the intuitive criterion
to the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we establish a unique separating equilibrium for every share of harm borne
by firms. For low levels of victim compensation, we show that (i) firms choose weakly higher care in a setting in which customers
do not know the firms’ type than in a setting in which they do, and (ii) the deviation in precaution taken due to asymmetric
information on firm type is welfare-improving. 相似文献
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This paper establishes that regulating harmless activity can be an effective instrument of law enforcement when the harmless activity and the harmful activity are interdependent. This type of regulation is not without cost, as it distorts the individual choices made by both law-abiding and non-law-abiding individuals. However, it can be socially advantageous when the impact on welfare resulting from changes in the choices of offenders dominates the impact of changes in non-offenders’ decisions; in addition, increasing deterrence by other means (such as raising the probability of detection or the magnitude of sanctions) can incur much higher costs. 相似文献