On the Exchange Rate as a Nominal Anchor: The Rise and Fall of the Credibility Hypothesis

The credibility hypothesis, which was used to support the use of a pegged exchange rate arrangement as a nominal anchor mechanism, is based on restrictive analytical foundations that circumscribe its real world applicability. While all pegged exchange rate arrangements are subject to circumstances that can undermine the sustainability of the peg, exchange rate nominal anchor pegs are especially fragile because such arrangements introduce problems that are endogenous to that particular type of regime. The East Asian crisis is used to demonstrate the fragility of exchange rate nominal anchor pegs, while the case of Australia demonstrates how a floating currency escaped the contagion of the East Asian crisis.     

A model of standard setting in auditing

Abstract. Auditing is modeled as a monitoring device to moderate information asymmetry between a firm manager and a consumer-investor in a contingent claims, general equilibrium model of a production economy. The firm manager may bias his report of state realization and returns to security holders. The role of the audit is to probabilistically discover and correct any such bias. Managers, who share in firm value, choose audit intensity in response to market forces. The market solution is characterized by a lack of unanimity between managers and consumer-investors with respect to audit intensity. This creates a demand by consumer-investors for Central Authority intervention. Standard setting is, thus, modeled as a response to public demands to remedy perceived shortcomings of a market solution. Some of the consequences of such intervention are examined. Résumé. La vérification représente un mécanisme de surveillance servant à réduire l'asymétrie d'information entre le gestionnaire et l'investisseur-consommateur, dans le cadre d'un modèle d‘économie de production fondé sur les réclamations éventuelles et Téquilibre général. Le gestionnaire peut “biaiser” le compte rendu des résultats et rendements présenté aux détenteurs de titres. Le rôle de la vérification consiste à découvrir (de façon probabiliste) et corriger toute forme de ce type de biais. Les gestionnaires, partageant dans la valeur de l'entreprise, choisissent l'intensité de la vérification en réaction aux pressions du marché. L'absence de consensus entre les gestionnaires et les consommateurs-investisseurs quant à l'intensité de la vérification caractérise la solution du marché. Cet état de fait suscite chez les consommateurs-investisseurs une demande d'intervention de la part d'une “autorité centrale”. La normalisation est dès lors assimilée à une réaction face aux demandes du public pour corriger les carences visibles de la solution du marché. Quelques conséquences d'une telle intervention sont étudiées ici.     

Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Workers in a wide variety of jobs are paid based on performance, which is commonly seen as enhancing effort and productivity relative to non-contingent pay schemes. However, psychological research suggests that excessive rewards can, in some cases, result in a decline in performance. To test whether very high monetary rewards can decrease performance, we conducted a set of experiments in the U.S. and in India in which subjects worked on different tasks and received performance-contingent payments that varied in amount from small to very large relative to their typical levels of pay. With some important exceptions, very high reward levels had a detrimental effect on performance.