Consequences and Institutional Determinants of Unregulated Corporate Financial Statements: Evidence from Embedded Value Reporting

I analyze Embedded Value (EV) reporting by firms with life insurance operations to assess the impact of unregulated financial reporting on transparency and to examine the institutional characteristics that promote unregulated reporting. Under EV accounting, the present value of future cash flows from in‐force contracts is included in shareholders’ equity, and profit is calculated as the change in equity between two periods. In contrast to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), this approach produces higher shareholder's equity and recognizes income at contract inception. I find firms that adopt EV reporting exhibit a decline in information asymmetry, with the decline increasing as EV reporting evolves to address methodological deficiencies and to permit more comparability across firms. The decrease in information asymmetry is contingent on providing an audit certification, and larger for firms that commit to providing EV reports. Moreover, I document that EV reporting is more widespread in countries with more hostile takeovers, managers that do not avoid volatile income measures, regulators that are less likely to intervene in the product market, and analysts that believe EV disclosure increases the value of their information intermediation function.     

A Conceptual Basis for a Recoverable Amount Test

Indecision, disagreement and confusion surround the literature on and accounting standards relating to a recoverable amount (RA)test and discussion about the appropriateness of discounting expected net future cashflows in the determination of RA. While a RA test is widely used in accounting standards, the concept and test in the professional literature and accounting standards is vague and ambiguous. Consequently the test is difficult to interpret and analyse rigorously. There is a need for an explicit conceptual basis to support accounting standards and practice relating to a RA test.     

Does the More Risk‐Averse Investor hold a Less Risky Portfolio?*

We study the suitability of using absolute risk aversion as a measure of willingness to take risk in the Arrow–Debreu portfolio framework. We define a global measure of risk for the Arrow–Debreu portfolio, which is measured by the sensitivity of an individual's Arrow–Debreu portfolio payoff to the change in the market return. We call this measure ‘conservatism’ and show that the concept of ‘more conservative’ is stronger than that of ‘more risk‐averse.’ A higher absolute risk aversion is only necessary but not sufficient to induce a less risky Arrow–Debreu portfolio. Our results not only challenge the well‐accepted notion that a more risk‐averse investor holds a less risky portfolio, but also suggest a stronger measure – conservatism – for evaluating the riskiness of portfolio.