Agenda 2009 – Wahlkampf!

Ohne Zusammenfassung Gert G. Wagner ist Lehrstuhlinhaber für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der TU Berlin und Forschungsdirektor am DIW Berlin. Er war Mitglied der Rürup-Kommission.     

Overtime reductions: Negligible employment effects

Summary Overtime hours were worked in Germany during the period 1990–1997 primarily by well-qualified blue-collar and white-collar workers. In addition, it is evident that overtime is increasingly being compensated by flexible leisure schedules. The scope for potential employment effects from a reduction of paid overtime is thus constantly decreasing and is much lower than the figures cited by unions in the current discussion. If the regulations to make working time more flexible being discussed in the “Alliance for Jobs’ were to be implemented, this would reinforce the observed trend towards compensation for overtime through leisure, further diminishing the potential employment effects. If the bargaining parties or the legislators would implement a reduction of overtime nonetheless, well-qualified blue-collar and white-collar workers in western Germany will suffer income losses.     

Folgen des Klimawandels: Versicherungspflicht wird unausweichlich!

Zusammenfassung   Der Wirbelsturm Ike, der Mitte September die texanische Stadt Galveston traf, machte einmal wieder deutlich, wie verletzlich die Zivilisation gegenüber dem Klimawandel ist. Auch in Deutschland werden die Folgen des Klimawandels zunehmend spürbar. Wie werden Betroffene von Naturkatastrophen in Deutschland entsch?digt? Was w?re das ?konomisch und ?kologisch effiziente Instrument beim Umgang mit den Klimafolgen? Prof. Dr. Gert G. Wagner, 55, lehrt zur Zeit als Fellow am Max Weber Kolleg in Erfurt. Am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) leitet er die L?ngsschnittstudie SOEP.     

Marginal Employment: No Jobs Miracle

Original Papers

Marginal Employment: No Jobs MiracleTowards a permanent decline of secondary employment?     

Friends with benefits: Behavioral and fMRI studies on the effect of friendship reminders on self-control for compulsive and non-compulsive buyers

Does the real or imagined presence of friends invariantly drive consumers to engage in disinhibited behavior, and give in to the “urge to splurge” in the face of consumption temptations? Or might there be situations in which being with friends or even merely thinking of friends or the friendships we have with them can actually improve self-control?In five studies, using a unique combination of controlled experiments examining overt consumer behavior and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we propose and show that the extent to which consumers identify a goal conflict between giving in to buying temptations on the one hand and the perceived consequences for maintaining satisfactory relationships with close friends on the other is a critical mediator of whether friendship reminders decrease or increase self-control. We further show that such a goal conflict is most likely for consumers with a chronic, compulsive tendency for uncontrolled, disinhibited acquisition and consumption—for consumers classified as compulsive buyers. For their non-compulsive counterparts, in contrast, acts of acquisition and consumption, even incidental disinhibited ones, are perceived to be less problematic in light of their friendships and hence do not induce a goal conflict to the same extent. Our findings provide insights into social influences on self-control and identify the concept of friendship reminders as a way to reduce a common type of dysfunctional consumer behavior. In addition to enhancing consumer well-being, reducing compulsive buying will substantially reduce handling costs for organizations. Hence, the findings are of academic, societal and managerial relevance.     

Formal and informal contract farming in Mozambique: Socially embedded relations of agricultural intensification

This paper explores the role of contract farming arrangements in agricultural intensification in sub-Saharan Africa, combining secondary literature and original case material from Mozambique. The paper extends the scope of “contract farming” beyond the formal contracts between large companies and small-scale producers to include less formal credit agreements between farmers and traders. It argues that such informal contract arrangements are evidence of farmers' agency in “real markets.” In the studied cases, farmers use contract farming opportunities to intensify agricultural production by investing in irrigation and inputs. While informal contracts typically concern locally consumed crops, thus with more possibilities for side selling than formal contracts for export crops with company-controlled markets, informal contract compliance reflects closely knit social ties between the contracting parties. In both formal and informal contracts, purchasers tend to seek out producers who are already irrigating, thus obtaining gains from farmers' earlier investments. This also implies contract farming as a mechanism for accelerating social differentiation arising from unequal access to irrigation. The paper argues that the significance of informal contracts in the studied cases raises the possibility that informal contract farming by local traders plays a more important role in agrarian transformation in Africa than formal contract farming by large companies.