Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner‐controlled firms and owner‐managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management‐controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Cascade of Fear: Policy Implementation and Financial Management Reform in the European Commission

The complexity of managing European Union (EU) spending programmes is the subject of much comment but relatively little academic analysis. Using a multi‐disciplinary analytical framework drawn from the management, policy and social sciences, this fieldwork‐based case study examines the reform of financial management within the European Commission. In constructing an agent focussed narrative of a specific reform episode, it contributes to a growing literature on public management reform analysed from this perspective and also to the lightly developed field of EU financial management.     

Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model

Employing survey and archival data from a sample of IPO firms, and extending the ideas of the Behavioral Agency Model, this study examines the influence of various forms of risk bearing created within the compensation contract on perceived risk taking. The results show that employment risk and variability in compensation each corresponds to greater risk taking, while downside risk and the intrinsic value of stock options correspond to lower risk taking. Among the implications from these results are the importance CEOs attach to relatively stable forms of pay, and to drawing distinctions between the potential for loss of pay and uncertainty about the amount of future pay. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Towards a Social Theory of Agency

We challenge critics of agency theory who suggest that agency theory's value does not extend outside a narrow context dominated by egocentric agents seeking only to maximize wealth at the expense of the principal. Instead, we argue that agency theory's flexibility allows for its application to a variety of non‐traditional settings where the key elements of agency theory, such as self‐interest, information asymmetry, and the mechanisms used to control agency costs can vary beyond the narrow assumptions implied in traditional agency‐based research. We suggest that extending agency theory to diverse settings using a deductive approach can be accomplished by formally recognizing and incorporating the institutional context surrounding principal–agent (P–A) relations into agency‐based models. Thus, criticisms that agency theory fails to acknowledge the social context in which P–A relations occur provides not a barrier but an opportunity for extending our understanding of P–A relations to a variety of diverse contexts.     

Heterogeneous worker ability and team-based production: Evidence from major league baseball, 1920–2009

A detailed longitudinal dataset is assembled containing annual performance and biographical data for every player over the entire history of professional major league baseball. The data are then aggregated to the team level for the period 1920–2009 in order to test whether teams built on a more even distribution of observed talent perform better than those teams with a mixture of highly able and less able players. The dependent variable used in the regressions is the percentage of games a team wins each season. We find that conditioning on average player ability, dispersion of both batting and pitching talent displays an optimal degree of inequality, in that teams with too high or too low a spread in player ability perform worse than teams with a more balanced distribution of offensive and defensive talent. These findings have potentially important applications both inside and outside the sporting world.     

Specification and testing of count data recreation demand functions

This article examines the effects of alternative formulations of count data recreation demand models on parameter estimates, model selection, and consumer surplus. The results indicate that large parameter and consumer surplus differences exists across the various count model formulations. More importantly, the results show that distributional assumptions, heteroscedastic functional forms, and overdispersion can have a substantial effect on consumer surplus estimates.     

The long goodbye: new establishments and the fall of union voice in Britain

This paper argues that the secular decline in union voice in the UK cannot be fully explained without understanding the role of employers in choosing and modifying voice regimes. The paper presents a model of employee voice; the model assumes regimes are chosen by firms on the basis of positive net benefits, and that once adopted there are switching costs associated with changing regimes. The paper presents data from WERS, which is then analysed in terms of the model. We find a rise in voice regimes that do not include unions (i.e. the growth of so-called non-union voice) and a clear decline in voice regimes involving unions, particularly union-only voice. Ecological factors (i.e. new entrants and the demise of older workplaces) are primary in explaining the rise in non-union voice, whereas the shift to dual forms of voice (made up of union and non-union regimes side by side) was primarily the result of switches undertaken by union only workplaces as early as the 1950s.     

Bank Competition and Loan Quality

We analyze the impact of bank competition on the equilibrium quality of loans in a formal model where banks do not observe the type of loan applicants, i.e. face an adverse selection problem, nor borrowers’ effort, i.e. also face a moral hazard problem. The main finding is that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and the average quality of loans. Policy implications are derived from this result and from an extension to the basic model where banks may sequentially acquire information about potential borrowers.