Developers, Herding, and Overbuilding

Recent years have seen the most pronounced turbulence that real estate markets have ever experienced. There have been wild swings in prices, a wave of foreclosures, countless failed investments, and massive overbuilding. This paper will be primarily concerned with overbuilding. Of the many forces that may have combined to produce this situation, the paper will focus on rational overbuilding carried out by developers whose decisions are made under uncertainty. We will establish the possibility of both statistical and reputation-based herding. The former refers to developers learning from each other, and so tending to copy. The latter refers to developers copying each other in order to reduce the probability of a loss of reputation that can result from making an unconventional choice.     

Divisional Performance Measurement with Divisions as Lessees of Head Office Assets

The paper examines some of the methods suggested in the literature for the evaluation of divisional performance, and proposes an alternative approach to the problem whereby divisions are treated as lessees of fixed assets owned by head office. It is suggested that this method is compatible with the NPV decision rule, yet does not require the company to adopt asset valuation practices which depart from those normally used for financial reporting; furthermore, the method actively considers both the ‘abandonment’ decision and whether or not ‘life expired’ assets should be disposed of. It is also claimed that the method is less open to manipulation than some other proposed performance measures.     

Patent Hold‐Up and Antitrust: How A Well‐Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold‐up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. This hold‐up problem can be solved with a damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law, but a damages remedy can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy also alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining with the result that fewer socially beneficial R&D projects are undertaken.     

A UK Empirical Test of the Larson-Gonedes Exchange Ratio Model

This paper adopts the Larson-Gonedes merger exchange ratio determination model to investigate the bargaining area in UK takeovers involving share-for-share exchanges. The model focuses on price-earnings ratios rather than share price returns and so is more consistent with practical valuation methods than other approaches. The basic model is extended for the UK to consider both cash alternative offers and mixed offers involving cash and equity consideration. The model is tested on a sample of 95 UK takeovers between 1984 and 1988 using consecutively unadjusted, FT All Share Index adjusted and beta adjusted price bases. The analysis adopts the conventional chi-square test used by Conn and Nielsen but, in addition, a new test is developed based on a Generalised Likelihood Ratio. We find that on an unadjusted price basis there is greater support for the Larson-Gonedes model in the UK than Conn and Nielsen found for the US. However, our extended model based on adjusted prices provides more cautious support. In addition, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results and provide further evidence on the wealth effects on acquiring and acquired company shareholders.     

How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

Global private information in international equity markets

This paper studies international equity markets when some investors have private information that is valuable for trading in many countries simultaneously. We use a dynamic model of equity trading to show that global private information helps explain US investors’ trading behavior and performance. In particular, the model predicts global return chasing (positive co-movement of US investors’ net purchases with returns in many countries) which we show to be present in the data. Return chasing in our model can be due to superior performance of US investors, not inferior knowledge or naive trend-following. We also show that trades due to private information are strongly correlated across countries. A common (global) factor accounts for about half their variation.     

An Introduction to the Symposium on the Use of Simulation in Applied Industrial Organization

Simulation offers a rigorous methodology for addressing policy or litigation issues that require a comparison of an observed state of the world with an unobserved one. Simulation employs a calibrated, structural oligopoly model to describe the unobserved state of the world. Calibration involves reliance on real-world observations to set the key parameter values in the model. Simulation is an increasingly important tool of the industrial organization economist, particularly in analyzing the competitive effects of mergers. Papers in this symposium illustrate merger simulations in a variety of contexts and one other application of simulation.