Convergence within the EU: Evidence from Interest Rates

The economic and political changes which are taking place in Europe affect interest rates. This paper develops a two-factor model for the term structure of interest rates specially designed to apply to EMU countries. In addition to the participant country's short-term interest rate, we include as a second factor a 'European' short-term interest rate. We assume that the 'European' rate follows a mean reverting process. The domestic interest rate also follows a mean reverting process, but its convergence is to a stochastic mean which is identified with the 'European' rate. Closed-form solutions for prices of zero coupon discount bonds and options on these bonds are provided. A special feature of the model is that both the domestic and the European interest rate risks are priced. We also discuss an empirical estimation focusing on the Spanish bond market. The 'European' rate is proxied by the ecu's interest rate. Through a comparison of the performance of our convergence model with a Vasicek model for the Spanish bond market, we show that our model provides a better fit both in-sample and out-of sample and that the difference in performance between the models is greater the longer the maturity of the bonds.
(J.E.L.: E43, C510).     

An Introduction to the Symposium on the Use of Simulation in Applied Industrial Organization

Simulation offers a rigorous methodology for addressing policy or litigation issues that require a comparison of an observed state of the world with an unobserved one. Simulation employs a calibrated, structural oligopoly model to describe the unobserved state of the world. Calibration involves reliance on real-world observations to set the key parameter values in the model. Simulation is an increasingly important tool of the industrial organization economist, particularly in analyzing the competitive effects of mergers. Papers in this symposium illustrate merger simulations in a variety of contexts and one other application of simulation.     

How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

Exploring a Regional Technical Efficiency Frontier in the Former USSR

Using 1971–90 panel data from a Siberian province, two econometric methods are used side by side to examine technical inefficiency with a suggestion as to how the methods might be used in sequence. Estimates derived from a random effects method reveal that technical inefficiency is both substantial and not time invariant. Results using either a random or fixed effects method suggest that existing estimates of technical inefficiency in centrally planned economies may be biased downward because of the choice of the estimation method. Using either method, the increasing technical inefficiency found is likely to be one cause of the decline in the performance of centrally planned economies and their regions.     

Using Simulation and Data Envelopment Analysis to Compare Assembly Line Balancing Solutions

This paper presents a technique for comparing the results of different assembly line balancing strategies by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Initially, several heuristics--which can be thought of as assembly line balancing strategies--were used to solve seven line-balancing problems. The resulting line balance solutions provided two pieces of information that were of particular interest: the number of workers needed and the amount of equipment needed. These two items were considered inputs for DEA. The different line balance solutions were then used as layouts for simulated production runs. From the simulation experiments, several output performance measures were obtained which were of particular interest and were used as outputs for DEA. The analysis shows that DEA is effective in suggesting which line balancing heuristics are most promising.     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

All in the family: why non-democratic leaders have more children

Economists have come to learn that politics matters. But survival matters the most to those involved in politics. We provide a theory whereby non-benevolent, non-democratic leaders increase their expected family size to raise the likelihood that a child will be a match at continuing the regime’s survival. As a consequence, having a larger family size raises the non-democratic leader’s expected rents that they can exploit from the citizenry. In contrast, democratic leaders have a lower desire to appropriate rents from the citizenry, and therefore have a diminished desire to have additional children for these purposes. We construct a data set of the number of children of country leaders as of August 31, 2005. We find that in a sample of 221 country leaders, fully non-democratic leaders have approximately 1.5–2.5 more actual children as compared to if they are fully democratic. This empirical relationship is established controlling for a full array of country specific as well as individual specific variables. Our finding also continues to hold when using alternative measures of family size. This paper has been prepared for a conference honoring Herschel I. Grossman at Brown University in April of 2006. We thank our discussant, Murat Iyigun, an anonymous referee, Michelle Garfinkel and conference participants for excellent suggestions.     

Ratio Analysis Using Rank Transformation

This paper presents an alternate method for transforming financial ratios. Ratios are ranked and scaled into a uniform distribution with boundaries between 0 and 1. Conceptually, we suggest that this method solves a number of methodological problems associated with ratios, including constrained choice of regression models, ratio outliers, negative ratios, and non-normal distributions. Scaled ranks of financial ratios are also conceptually appealing because they appear to capture comparative ordinal data about cross-sectional relationships between firms.The study empirically tests scaled rank transformations by examining the association of the transformations with stock returns. Results show that models using relative ranked accounting ratios have more explanatory and predictive power than untransformed, log-transformed and square-root transformed ratios.