加强对大学生的劳动教育刻不容缓

本文根据马克思主义关于教育的基本原理,阐述了加强大学生劳动教育对全面贯彻党的教育方针和促进人的协调发展的重要意义与巨大作用,并由此提出了如何做好这方面工作的措施和对策。     

当代大学生网络政治参与情况的调查与分析——以江苏高校为例

通过对江苏4所高校1044名在校大学生进行问卷调查和访谈,发现当代大学生网络政治参与具有四大特征:一是大学生网络政治参与具有超越时空的虚拟性;二是大学生网络政治参与内容广泛、渠道多样;三是认知和行为脱节,理性和非理性共存;四是大学生网络政治参与具有双重效应,既能促进大学生政治社会化,影响政府决策,又易导致大学生或参与失度,或远离现实政治,甚至危及政治稳定。因此,必须通过高校教育引导、政府政策调控、个人自我修炼三方协同努力提高大学生政治参与水平和质量。     

基于物流视角的北宋粮食纲运分析

基于物流系统要素理论,从一般要素、功能要素、支持要素和物质基础要素四个方面分析了北宋粮食纲运系统,从纲制编排与纲运限程、纲运管押与催检、行运秩序与安全保障三个方面描述了北宋粮食纲运的管理过程,纲运过程存在着诸如纲物丢失、损坏、延期运抵等问题,造成这些问题的主要原因是在押纲、催检和起卸三个环节上的官吏腐败。     

Migrate or not? The effects of regulation SHO on options trading activities

In this study, we investigate the effects of stock short-sale constraints on options trading by exploiting two US Securities and Exchange Commission rule changes under Regulation SHO: Rule 203 (locate and close-out requirements) and Rule 202T (temporary removal of short-sale price tests). We find that stock short selling activities decrease (increase) significantly after Rule 203 (Rule 202T) implementation, supporting the validity of Rule 203 (Rule 202T) as an exogenous increase (decrease) in short-sale constraints. Options volume increases significantly after Rule 203 went into effect and the result is more pronounced among firms with lower levels of institutional ownership and smaller options bid-ask spreads. Therefore, the evidence from Rule 203 suggests that investors may use options as substitutes for stock short sales when short selling is less feasible or more costly due to the locate and delivery requirements. In contrast, we find no significant change in the options trading volume of pilot stocks during the pilot program of Rule 202T. Overall, our results indicate that the impact of short-sale constraints on options trading varies with the types of constraints affected.     

Short and long-term interactions between venture capital returns and the macroeconomy: evidence for the United States

The main purpose of this paper is to empirically model the influence of macroeconomic and financial variables on the performance of risk capital in the US. We start our investigation using a static long-run equilibrium model. In contrast to previous studies, we analyze the effect of several factors simultaneously within the framework of a vector error correction model (VECM). This allows us to study short- and long-term interactions to overcome the problem of endogeneity, and to discover causal mechanisms. The results show that the value of venture capital investments is positively related to industrial production, the exit channel Nasdaq, and the long-term interest rate. However, the value of venture capital investments is negatively related to the short-term interest rate. According to the short-term dynamics, VEC Granger causality confirms that only industrial production influences venture capital performance, while venture capital returns Granger causes Nasdaq performance.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.